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ARTICLES 
THE THREE TYPES OF COLLUSION: 
FIXING PRICES, RIVALS, AND RULES 
ROBERTH. LANDE * & HOWARDP. MARVEL** 
Antitrust law has long held collusion to be paramount among the 
offenses that it is charged with prohibiting. The reason for this prohibition 
is simple----collusion typically leads to monopoly-like outcomes, including 
monopoly profits that are shared by the colluding parties. Most collusion 
cases can be classified into two established general categories.) Classic, or 
"Type I" collusion involves collective action to raise price directly? Firms 
can also collude to disadvantage rivals in a manner that causes the rivals' 
output to diminish or causes their behavior to become chastened. This "Type 
11" collusion in turn allows the colluding firms to raise prices.3 
Many important collusion cases, however, do not fit into either of these 
categories. The conventional categories simply cannot classify or explain 
cases like National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,4 Bates 
• Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
.. Professor of Economics and Law, The Ohio State University. The authors 
would likc to thank David Balto, Ken Brevoort, Stephen Calkins, Peter Carstensen, Albert 
Foer, Warren Grimes, George Hay, John Kwoka, Lawrence Landman, Steven Salop, and 
Mary Lou Steptoe for their extremely helpful comments, and Elise Balkin, Kelly Phillips, and 
Michaela Roberts for their diligent research assistanee. 
1. We use "collusion" as shorthand to distinguish anticompetitive joint activity 
from benign or procompetitive joint activity, which usually is labeled a "joint venture." For 
some of the complexities that arise in distinguishing between these categories, see Howard 
H. Chang, et aI., Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy Toward Joint 
Ventures, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223. Because this Article analyzes only horizontal 
collusion, all uscs of the term "collusion" should be understood to mean only horizontal 
collusion. 
2. FormaIly, classic coIlusion exists when firms cooperate to move toward a 
monopoly outcome. They raise prices jointly, either by controlling the prices directly, by 
agrceing to restrict output, or by dividing the market into sub markets, each of which is 
monopolized by a cartel mcmber. Infra Part I.A. 
3. Infra Part I.B. 
4. 435 U.S. 679 (\ 978). The National Society of Professional Engineers 
promulgated an ethical code that forbade membcrs from discussing price until immediately 
before contracts were signed. Id. at 683-84. Customers typically made a considerable 
investment in time working with the engineers to fully specify the project in detail. Prices, 
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v. State Bar of Arizona,s FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 6 Detroit 
Auto Dealers Ass 'n,7 and United States v. Stop & Shop Cos.s Moreover, none 
of the rationales offered for Type I or IT collusion is capable of explaining 
why the conduct in these anomalous cases was anticompetitive. Indeed, most 
of these exceptional cases involved heterogeneous products and individually-
negotiated or otherwise non-transparent prices that made traditional price 
fixing unlikely. Even though each of these cartels was properly condemned 
because each had engaged in anticompetitive 'conduct, the cases are 
nonetheless troubling analytically. None involved an agreement either to raise 
prices, to restrict output, or to divide markets. Nor did any involve collusion 
to disadvantage rivals. Most importantly, in each case cartel members 
continued to set prices and output independently. 
Instead, collusion in each case permitted firms to manipulate the rules 
under which the independent decisions of the colluding firms were made. The 
altered rules induced anticompetitive changes in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium reached in the marketplace. Simply put, the rules of competition 
however, were not revealed until after the specification process was complete. Although a 
customer could refuse to engage the engineer after leaming of her rates, the customer's ability 
to comparison shop based upon the prices of engineering services was severely impaired. For 
a more extensive discussion of this case, see infra Part II.A2.e. 
5. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates involved an ethical code promulgated by a group 
of competing lawyers tHat mandated a nearly total prohibition against advertising by every 
member of that profession. Id. at 353-54. The Court held that advertising by lawyers would 
have been likely to lead to lower prices for consumers and, on the whole, been beneficial. Id. 
at 377-82. For a more extensive discussion of this case see infra Part II.A I.a. 
6. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). Ind. Fed'n Of Dentists involved a group of competing 
dentists that agreed not to provide patients' x-rays to insurance companies. Id. at 448-509. 
The x-rays helped the insurers determine whether certain dental procedures were necessary. 
Instead, the dentists agreed to require the insurance companies to come visit each dentist's 
office to examine patient·records. Id. at 450. This requirement made it much more difficult 
for the insurers to detect fraud and unnecessary dental work. Id. For a more extensive 
discussion of this case see infra Part II.B.I. 
7. III F.T.C. 417 (1989). Members of the Detroit Auto Dealers Association 
entered into an agreement to severely restrict the evening and weekend hours they would be 
open. Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, III F.T.C. 418, 420 (1987) (intial decision). This caused 
shopping to become significantly more difficult for consumers. See id. at 423. The 
agreement led to several types of harm to consumer welfare, including prices that were higher 
than they would have been if the market had been functioning with shopping hours that had 
been set by competition. Id. For a more extensive discussion of this case see infra Part 
II.A.2.a. 
8. 19854-2 Tradc Cas. (CCH) ~ 66,689 (Nov. 9, 1984). Grocery stores agreed not 
to offer double the face amount of manufacturer coupons. Id. Their agreement did not set 
either grocery store prices or margins, but merely discounts from those margins. The effect 
of the agreement was felt principally by customers most willing to comparison shop among 
different grocers. Id. For more detailed consideration of this case, sce infra note 165 and 
accompanying text. 
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were changed and the scope of competition was narrowed. 
The collusive conduct in these cases permitted the cartel members to 
insulate themselves from one another, at least partially, thereby establishing 
market segments within which each of the cartel member~ had increased 
pricing freedom. Their newfound isolation provided benefits similar to those 
attainable from market power acquired in more traditional fashion. By 
increasing the space between cartel members, each achieved the power to 
raise prices. In these cases, collusion could generate profit increases even 
though the competing firms did not get together to set prices. Rather, they 
competed less vigorously or in a restricted manner in the environment their 
collusion had altered. The colluding firms continued to compete in some 
dimensions, but the fight had been fixed-the rules of competition had been 
rigged, and the firms did not have to compete as fiercely. 
The most straightforward examples of this type of collusion involve 
efforts to soften competition among rivals by limiting the information 
available to consumers. Examples include direct restrictions on advertising,9 
agreements to boycott publications that provide pricing information to 
consumers,IO or instructions to consumers on ways to search or bargain more 
effectively. II In each of these examples, collusion serves to raise consumer 
search costs or to make searching impractical; the result is to insulate cartel 
members to some degree from certain forms of competition among 
themselves. In other instances, collusion essentially separates customers, and 
permits the colluding firms to engage in price discrimination-for example, 
through the use of agreements not to provide discounts to certain customers. 12 
In this Article we will explore a number of examples of previously 
unexplained or uncategorizable cartels that can be explained by this construct. 
We will show that, together, they form a third general category of 
anti competitive behavior that we refer to as "Type III" collusion.13 
Part I of this Article will briefly discuss the two conventional categories 
of collusion. Part n will then demonstrate how collusion to manipulate the 
rules of competition differs from traditional paradigms, and why many 
important cases fall within this new category. Part ill will briefly discuss 
some cases that contain practices characteristic of more than one category. 
Part N will then discuss how the welfare effects of this newly described 
9. See infra Part H.A.I. 
10. See infra Part H.A.l.c. 
1 I. See infra Part II.A.2. 
12. See infra Part H.C. 
13. It seems likely that every unilateral antitrust violation also can be classified into 
one of these three categories. Unilateral actions are not, however, the focus of this Article. 
Nevertheless, it may be true that in some sense all antitrust cases could be placed in one of 
six meta-categories. 
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collusion paradigm differ from those arising from the other two types of 
collusion. This Part will also demonstrate that rule fixing is not always 
anticompetitive. Part N will show how firms can join to fix the rules of 
competition for benign or procompetitive purposes. Finally, Part V provides 
a brief conclusion that summarizes some of the implications of our proposed 
classification system. 
I. THE TwO CONVENTIONAL CATEGORIES OF 
ANTI COMPETITIVE COLLUSION 
A. Classic ("Type /") Collusion 
The classic understanding of collusion is that firms collude in order to 
mimic the actions of a monopoly.14 The monopoly outcome arises as the 
cartel members agreelS either to restrict OUtput,16 to raise prices, or to divide 
markets. 17 This agreement allows cartel members to maximize their profit 
14. "The pure collusive practice involves cooperation between compcting sellers 
(in the form of an agreement, express or tacit, limiting competition, or a merger or other 
method of fusion) to raise the market price above the competitive level." RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 28 (1976). 
Although cartel agreements arc illegal, when this type of market power is exercised 
unilaterally, by a monopolist, it usually is legal. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563 (1966). Only in rare occasions, such as when it was unlawfully acquired through an 
illegal merger, or when it is manifested through practices such as certain tying arrangements, 
can it be illegal. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). A 
cartel also can pay sub-competitive prices to suppliers. The analysis of monopsony cartels is 
analogous to that of monopoly cartels. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, 
MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS (1993). Monopsony cartels also can be illegal. 
See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th 
Cir. 1971). 
15. This Article will only analyze cases where an agreement can be shown. It will 
not discuss cases in which facilitating practices can be alleged to be adopted unilaterally by 
firms in search ofa share ofa monopoly outcome. For example, this Article will not discuss 
unilateral adoption of advance announcements of price increases, most favored customer 
clauses, or uniform delivered pricing practices. The Federal Trade Commission 
unsuccessfully challenged these types of practices in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 
729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). See generally Donald S. Clark, Price Fixing Without Collusion: 
An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices after Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REv. 887. 
16. The cartel can seek monopoly profits by imposing quotas on its members. 
OPEC is one cartel that allocates this type of quota to its members. See DENNIS W. CARLTON 
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 214-28 (2d ed. 1994). 
17. For collusion to be effective many prerequisites must exist, including market 
power in a well-defined market and effective barriers to the entry of new competition. 
Otherwise the market's natural tendency towards self-correction will prevent the cartel from 
harming consumer welfare. For a more detailed discussion, see CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra 
note 16, at 175-228. 
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directly, at the expense of consumer welfare. ls 
There are several variations of classic collusion. Direct price fixing is 
the most straightforward. 19 Alternatively, the cartel can achieve a monopoly 
outcome for the market as a whole by dividing the market into competition-
free portions assigned to individual cartel members. Cartels can do this by 
assigning exclusive territories or customers.20 Another common variation, 
bid rigging/I effectively creates a monopoly in the market and allocates it to 
different cartel members over time.22 
Sometimes the practices over which collusion occurs are ancillary to the 
agreements over the prices themselves. As Richard Posner notes, 
"[c]onfronting a price-fixing rule that attaches conclusive significance to 
proof of an 'actual' agreement to fix prices, competitors have an incentive to 
engage in all of the preliminary steps required to coordinate their pricing but 
to stop just short of 'agreeing' on what price to charge.'.23 An anticompetitive 
agreement can facilitate price-setting, for example, by making cheating on a 
cartel price transparent and hence unattractive.24 Rivals can also agree upon 
18. For a formal welfare analysis see JEAN TiROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 67 (1988). 
19. For a discussion of straightforward price-fixing arrangements, see I A.B.A. SEC. 
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOMENTS 78-87 (4th ed. 1997). The vitamin cartel 
is a recent example of a large price-fixing cartel. Price Fixing: Hoffman-LaRoche, BASF 
Plead Guilty, Agree to Pay Over $700 Million in Fines, 76 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 
(BNA) 558 (May 20, 1999); see also Price Fixing: Tokai Carbon Will Plead Guilty, Pay Fine 
for Role in Graphite Electrode Cartel, 76 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 484 (May 6, 
1999). 
Sometimes price fixing cartels assign responsibility for markcting the cartel members' 
products to a joint sales agency. The DeBeers diamond cartel has long used this device 
successfully. For a discussion of joint sales agencies, see GEORGE l STIGLER, THE 
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 41 (1968). 
20. ANTITRUST L. DEVS., supra note 19, at 97-100. 
21. /d. at 66-67; see also United States v. Reicher, 983 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 
1992) (defining bid rigging as "[a]ny agreement between competitors pursuant to which 
contract offers are to be submitted [to] or withheld from a third party ... "). Sometimes bid-
rigging will occur in procurement auctions for projects with perfectly inelastic demand over 
a range of prices extending substantially above the competitive price, such as certain public 
works projects. In these cases output might not decrease. 
22. There are many variations of bid-rigging. See supra, note 21. For example, 
sometimes members pool profits. For a classic example, see generally Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
23. POSNER, supra note 14, at 135. 
24. For example, Westinghouse was alleged to have agreed through a license with 
General Electric to adopt the terms of sale chosen by General Electric for sales of light bulbs. 
The terms included resale price maintenance, which might have been used to ensure that any 
discounts offered to light bulb wholesalers would appear transparently at the retail level. 
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 lL. & ECON. 86,99-104 
(1960); see also ANTITRUST L. DEVS., supra note 19, at 64-74. 
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strategies to strengthen secret or tacit agreements/5 or strategies that punish 
consumers or cartel members who deviate from approved prices.26 Although 
these variations of classic collusion are less straightforward than simple price 
fixing, each has in common a collective decision to attain monopoly pricing 
directly or to facilitate monopoly coordination by reducing the likelihood or 
deviations from monopoly pricing. 
Finally, the Type I collusion may in some cases involve collusion over 
dimensions other than price, when the goal of the collusion is nonetheless to 
mimic the result that a monopolist could obtain in the marketplace. For 
example, firms may agree to change product characteristics or to delay 
innovation in order to reduce costs.27 Still, the cartel's desire for a collective 
shift from competitive to monopoly pricing distinguishes these situations 
from those we will describe in Part n, which are designed to manipulate non-
cooperative outcomes. 
25. This can be accomplished through an explicit agreement over the collection and 
dissemination of information. For classic examples, see generally Maple Flooring Mfrs' Ass 'n 
v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); and Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 
U.S. 377 (1921). 
26. Glenn Ellison, Theories o/Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, 
25 RAND J. ECON. 37,48-56 (1994) (discussing the economic effects of secret price cuts). 
27. See, e.g., Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n, 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 
421 (7th Cir. 1965). The macaroni manufacturers in this case had agrecd to reduce the 
proportion of durum wheat in their products. Although the case involved a number of 
complications, to the extent that their motivation for doing so was to depress the price of 
durum wheat, such an agreement would enable them to operate effectively as a monopsony. 
There have been a number of alleged conspiracies not to innovate. For example, the 
patent pool at issue in United States v. M/rs. Aircraft Ass 'n., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 
60,810, was supposed to have limited innovation by its members. But see George 
BittJingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement, 31 J.L. & 
ECON. 227, 232 (1988). 
One more example of an allegation of this type is provided by United States v. Visa 
USA, Inc., 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 72,584. The Department of Justice alleged that the 
Visa and MasterCard corporations agreed upon a number ofpraetices, ineluding an agreement 
not to engage in certain types of product development. The firms allegedly agreed not to 
develop and market, or delayed development and marketing of smart cards, commercial cards, 
and methods for making Internet transactions more secure. The government's allegation that 
"the amount of money that Visa spent-was reduced because it became apparent that it was 
going to be a dual world" indicates clearly the link between this agreement and the restricted 
innovation that a monopolist supposedly would choose for itself. 
Note, however, that some collusive arrangements' that have been interpreted as Type I 
collusion to reduce costs are more appropriately treated at Type III collusion. See infra Part 
II.A.2.a and text accompanying note 88 (discussing Detroit Auto Dealers Ass 'n). 
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B. Collusion to Disadvantage Rivals ("Type II" Collusion) 
As outlined in the previous section, the first category of collusive 
agreement involves mechanisms to control the behavior of the members of 
the cartel themselves-the agreement looks inward. A second general 
category of collusion consists of agreements to take action jointly to harm 
rivals that are not party to the collusion.28 Firms can target competitors or 
potential competitors in a manner that subsequently permits the colluding 
firms to raise prices and profits in either of two ways. 
First, firms can reduce their rivals' revenues through such tactics as 
boycotts29 or predatory pricing.3D When effective, these practices cause rivals 
to exit the market or to curb their competitiveness. After the victims have 
been eliminated or cowed, the predators are able to raise their prices, 
presumably through an agreement among themselves.3) 
Alternatively, firms can raise their rivals' costs in a manner that enables 
the colluders to raise prices under an umbrella created by the higher prices 
that the victims must charge.32 Firms can agree to take actions that will 
28. Although analytically distinct, in practice, agreements to disadvantage rivals 
often occur in conjunction with agreements that should be classified under classic collusion. 
In fact, the prescnce of one form of collusion could reinforce or make morc likely the other 
form. Thomas G. Krattenmaker et aI., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 
76 GEO. LJ. 241, 251 (1987). 
Other times, agreements to disadvantage rivals have the effect of manipulating the rules 
of non-cooperative competition (a category of collusion that will be discussed in Part II of 
this article). Practices that give rise to both types of harm will be analyzed in more detail in 
Part III, infra. 
29. See, e.g., N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 
472 U.S. 284 (1985); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
30. Although cases in which predatory pricing is alleged are easy to find, there is 
considerablc debate over how often successful predation actually occurs. Scholars also 
disagree over whether the antitrust laws should attempt to deal with this phenomenon. This 
Article does not enter into this debate. For summaries of the scholarly litcrature and empirical 
arguments as to how common anticompetitive predatory pricing is, see William J. Baumol, 
Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1996); 
Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of 
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L. REv. 655 (1982). 
31. There are many variations of this simple paradigm, and countless complexities 
and problems associated with various scenarios, all of which are beyond the scope of this 
article. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory 
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) and James D. Hurwitz & 
William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 V AND. L. REV. 
63 (1982). 
32. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986); 
Krattenmaker et aI., supra note 28. 
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disadvantage rivals, whether actual or potential, thereby forcing the rivals to 
raise prices. This, in turn, permits colluding fIrms either to raise prices or to 
deter entry that would otherwise erode prices.33 Anticompetitive behavior by 
cartels that raises their rivals' costs is thought to be especially common when 
government regulation is involved.34 Of course, many corporate actions that 
raise rivals' costs or reduce rivals' revenues are based upon efficiency and are 
socially desirable.35 Nevertheless, collusion to disadvantage competitors, like 
classic collusion, is a distinct category of anticompetitive conduct. Still, these 
two traditional categories of collusion do not explain a signifIcant amount of 
anticompetitive joint corporate activity.36 
33. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 
(1988); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 635 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986), discussed 
in Krattennmaker et aI., supra, note 28, at 258 n.77. 
34. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); see 
also Howard P. Marvel, Factory Regulation: A Reinterpretation of Early English Experience, 
20 J.L. & ECON. 379 (1977). 
35. When a firm invests in innovation, for example, this can have the effect of 
raising its rivals' costs. Antitrust policy should be careful, of course, not to deter socially 
desirable innovation. For a discussion of this, see Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 32, at 
277-82. 
36. The two categories of collusion discussed thus far are familiar, and not 
surprisingly, other authors have previously offered classification schemes to deal with other 
types of collusion as well. Our approach is similar in certain respects to the framework 
suggested by James Langenfeld and Louis Silvia. They cogently analyzed and classified a 
group of 81 FTC horizontal restraint cases that resulted in Commission Orders between 1980 
and 1992. Their first two categories, traditional collusion and raising rivals' costs, are nested 
within our Types I and II. To explain the remaining cases, they introduce a third category, 
which they term "raising own costs." James L. Langenfeld & Louis Silvia, Federal Trade 
Commission Horizontal Restraint Cases: An Economic Perspective, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 
655 (1992). They define the third category broadly: "Anticompetitive agreements or restraints 
under the raising own costs theory involve placing restrictions on the colluding group itself 
(or its customers)." [d. Their formulation is an interesting one, but is, in our view, 
simultaneously too broad and too vague to usefully categorize the cases we deal with here. 
As noted, our Type I collusion corresponds to their first category. Our second category, 
Type II collusion, consists of practices that raise rivals' costs (their second group) and also 
practices that reduce rivals' revenue. Our Type III category is in some respects similar to their 
third category-many restrictions can be explained either in terms of a group of firms raising 
their "own costs," or in terms of "rule fixing." This is especially true since their term "raising 
own costs" includes practices that raise customers' costs. Unfortunately, however, a group 
of firms may accept increases in its own costs in order to raise its rivals' costs by even more. 
This differential cost increase was the motivation for the willingness of steam-powered cotton 
mill owners in nineteenth-century Great Britain to seek cost-increasing restrictions on the 
hours of child laborers; mills dependent on less predictable water power were far more 
affected by the restrictions. See Marvel, supra note 34, at 389. Similar arguments have been 
made to explain manufacturer support for safety and environmental regulations. See, e.g., 
Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality 
Regulation, 25 1.L. & ECON. 99 (1982). Thus the proposed "raising own costs" classification 
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11. "TYPE llI" COLLUSION: MANIPULATING THE RULES 
UNDER WHICH COMPETITION TAKES PLACE 
A. Distancing and Differentiating Products to Soften Competition 
949 
Thus far this Article has emphasized that classic Type I collusion 
involves agreements to cooperate directly toward the goal of monopoly profits 
or, at a minimum, toward the best cooperative outcome that the collaborators 
can obtain without attracting outside attention or destabilizing their 
agreement.37 The cases discussed in this section, however, do not involve 
agreements over market outcomes. This Article has also emphasized that 
collusion to disadvantage rivals is outward looking. In contrast, the collusion 
in the following cases is inward looking, imposing restrictions upon the 
cartel's members instead of increasing the costs of sellers outside the 
agreement. 
Indeed, the market participants in each of the cases discussed in this Part 
independently determined price, output levels, or both. They have, however, 
jointly manipulated the rules of competition to ensure that the equilibria in 
these markets, despite not being determined cooperatively, yielded supra-
competitive prices and profits. They proceeded to affect rules indirectly, 
rather than directly by choosing outcomes, either because of the legal 
strictures against collusion or because the parties to the agreement would not, 
had they implemented classic collusion, have effectively been able to monitor 
compliance by their rivals.38 
overlaps significantly with Type 11 collusion. 
In fact, most of the cases that we classify as "rule-fixing" do not raise the costs of the 
cartel's members. The hour limitations in Detroit Auto Dealers Ass 'n, for example, might 
have actually decreased the colluders' costs since they were open fewer hours. Neither the 
advertising restriction cases or many of the other cases we analyzed necessarily increased the 
cartel members costs. Further, our Type III restraints include practices that affect price 
discrimination and discounting. These practices need not increase the cartel members' costs. 
Langenfeld and Silvia are correct that if the practices in the third category do not raise 
the cartel members' own costs, they raise their consumers' costs. However, every cartel-
Types I, II, and III-raises consumers' costs. But recognizing this does not explain very well 
why these cases differ from the other cartel cases. We believe that our approach to Type 1lI 
cartels, framing the issues in terms of fixing the rules of competition to isolate and exploit 
consumers, better conveys thc mechanism for and explanation as to why these practices are 
anti competitive. 
37. For an example ofa cooperative agreement that fell short of monopoly pricing, 
see New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d \065, \084 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 848 (1988) (sellers agreed to limits on winning bids agreed upon in hopes of avoiding 
detection of collusion by purchaser). 
38. For example, some markets involve individually negotiated transactions that 
would be very difficult for a cartel to observe. Collusive agreement and monitoring will also 
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Typically, the goal of this "Type III" collusion is to change the rules of 
competition in a manner that lessens the price competition among cartel 
members. In economics, the simplest available model of non-cooperative 
price competition deals with markets in which identical firms offer a 
homogeneous product for sale to a marketplace inhabited by fully informed 
consumers. Economists typically model price competition in such a market 
using the concept of Bertrand equilibrium.39 
The Bertrand model's prediction for price competition is brutal indeed. 
Fully informed customers will choose to visit their lowest-priced outlets, 
forcing prices down to marginal cost, at least as long as the firms in question 
have not reached the limits of their respective capacities. It is little wonder 
that firms might wish to avoid the rigors of this competition, and that they 
will, if possible, adopt rules to soften its impact. These rules will be addressed 
as the prerequisites of intense Bertrand competition, principally that 
consumers must possess full information and that the products offered to 
consumers must be identical. 
The principle of differentiation40 holds that when confronted with the 
specter of this fiercely competitive environment, firms will make efforts to 
differentiate their products in order to soften price competition.41 Customers 
who have a strong preference for the unique attributes of a firm's products, 
whether real or perceived, will be willing to pay a premium that varies 
be difficult ifthe cartel members produce produets that differ from one another. Some ofthe 
restrictions discussed below, such as agreements not to advertise prices, will actually make 
classic collusion more difficult by making the prices of potential cartel members more 
difficult for rivals to observe. 
39. Most non-cooperative game theoretic models of oligopoly seek a Nash 
equilibrium for the game under study. A Nash equilibrium is a set of actions for each player 
such that no playcr wishes to change its choice of action, given the actions of its rivals. In 
contrast to the monopoly model, for which the profit maximizing monopoly outcome can be 
obtained by consideration of the ehoicc of either output or price, the Nash equilibrium for a 
game in which firms choose the quantity to offer (termed a Coumot equilibrium) is very 
different from the Nash equilibrium (termed a Bertrand equilibrium) that emerges when firms 
compete over prices. When choosing a quantity holding the quantities of rival firms fixed, 
each individual firm exercises a modicum of monopoly power. In contrast, a Bertrand 
equilibrium is very competitive: a firm, observing a price of its rival in excess of their 
common marginal cost, will wish to steal the entire market through a slight shading of the 
rival's price. The only equilibrium in such a game is for price to equal marginal cost, yielding 
no economic profits (revenues in cxcess of opportunity cost) to any ofthc market participants. 
Unlike perfect competition, where numerous rivals are required in ordcr to render the actions 
of anyone firm negligible, Bertrand equilibrium yields its low price equilibrium when two 
firms compete. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 244-45. 
40. See TIROLE, supra note 18, at 278, 286. 
41. Differentiating a product from those of rivals means that the firm's demand 
curve will not be perfectly elastic (flat), but will instead exhibit some downward slope-a 
slight increase in price will not cause all of its customers to defect immediately. 
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according to the strength of that preference. A finn facing a downward-
sloping demand curve has the ability to raise price above marginal cost, 
permitting it at least the possibility of earning some profit. Whether it can 
actually do so for long depends on the speed of entry into its market. But even 
if it is not sufficient to ensure increased profitability in the long run, 
downward-sloping demand is clearly desirable from thc standpoint of a finn. 
What will generate such demand? Consumers will not all defect 
instantly to a lower-priced rival if they prefer the products of their current 
supplier, or if they have limited knowledge of either the prices or the product 
characteristics offered by potential rivals. Finns therefore can generate 
downward-sloping demand by manufacturing distinctive products, selling 
them at locations separate from rivals, and taking action to limit their 
customers' knowledge of the offerings of others. If some of a firm's 
customers are more likely to defect to rivals than others, the finn would prefer 
to isolate those customers, offering special inducements not granted to loyal 
patrons. In many cases, finns can pursue unilaterally the strategies best suited 
to differentiate themselves from rivals, but in other cases, cooperative action 
may be optimal. Many, but not all, of these actions have the effect of raising 
consumers' search costs. We begin by considering the best-known strategy 
for differentiation: advertising. 
1. AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT ADVERTISING 
Advertising is among the leading instruments available to a finn wishing 
to differentiate its products from those of its rivals, thereby softening price 
competition.42 Yet advertising can also infonn consumers about product 
attributes in ways that stimulate comparison shopping, and thus competition. 
For this reason, cases involving restrictions on advertising constitute the first 
class of collusive agreements that we consider as candidates for softening 
competition in an anticompetitive manner. 
When advertisements serve to differentiate products from one another, 
the separation that one finn achieves from a rival in consumers' minds may 
benefit the rival as well---each producer can target the customers who prefer 
its offerings, benefiting from customer loyalty by being able to increase 
prices. Coordination of advertising levels for such advertising are important 
only for advertising designed to expand the market for the product category 
in question.43 But advertising need not increase separation of rivals through 
42. We do not mean to imply that advertising for product differentiation is 
necessarily harmful. New and improved products win often require advertising in order to 
be able to defeat familiar, but inferior, incumbents. 
43. For example, the joint advertising campaign for milk is run by an association 
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product differentiation. Advertising that informs customers about alternatives 
enables consumers to compare products and can thereby stimulate price 
competition. An advertisement that announces the availability of a product 
to consumers of other firms may make these consumers more likely to switch 
brands. Indeed, advertising of search characteristics,44 such as price and 
availability, increases the number of options for consumers and forces firms 
to compete more vigorously for those consumers. In essence, price 
advertising increases the ability of consumers to compare options, thereby 
lessening the effective separation of rivals and, accordingly, the price the 
rivals can charge.45 Price advertising, unlike brand promotion, thus works 
counter to the principle of differentiation.46 
whose mission is one of"build[ing] demand for U.S. dairy produced dairy products on behalf 
of America's . . . dairy farmers." Dairy Management, Inc., Who We Are, at 
http://www.dairyinfo.comlaboutlwho.html(last visited Nov. 12,2000). Efforts include its 
"Ahh, the Power of Cheese" and "Got Milk?" campaigns. See American Dairy Ass'n, I Love 
Cheese, at http://www.ilovecheese.com(lastvisitedNov.28.2000);GotMilk?.at 
http://www.gotmilk.comlstory.html(last visited Nov. 20, 2000); see also Reinventing the 
Wheel, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. II, 1998, at I. In cases where advertising increases the 
market demand for a product, it is possible that agreements to facilitate advertising will be 
desirable in order to overcome free riding. Note, however, that demand-increasing 
advertising may also be undertaken unilaterally. For example, dental "quality and comfort 
advertising may induce some customers to obtain non-emergency care when they might not 
otherwise do so." . Cal. Dental Ass 'n, 128 F.3d at 728. 
44. Search characteristics are those that can be verified prior to purchase. For 
instance, if a firm advertises a price of $19.95 for a particular video game cartridge, 
consumers can verify the price when they arrive at that firm's location prior to making a 
purchase. Indeed, both the price and the availability of the particular game are search 
characteristics. Characteristics of the game itself can include a mix of search and experience 
characteristies. A claim that the game has exceptional computer graphics may be verified by 
the consumer if the retailer offers demonstrations prior to purchase, but a claim that the game 
in question will provide hours of enjoyment to purchasers cannot be verified until the 
consumer has spent hours in front of a television screen. The latter claim is termed an 
experience characteristic. Phillip Nelson, Advertising as In/ormation, 82 J. POL. EeoN. 729, 
730 (1974). Experience goods-those with important characteristics that cannot be verified 
prior to purchase-appear to be advertised much more heavily than search goods. 
45. Knowledge of prices of rivals makes a firm's own customers more willing to 
defect, increasing the elasticity of demand (flattening the demand schedule) that the firm faces 
and lowering its profit-maximizing price, given the prices of rivals. 
46. This pro-competitive view of advertising has been endorsed by the courts on a 
number of occasions. "Advertising 'serves to inform the public of the ... prices of products 
and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources. '" Morales 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,388 (1992) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 
433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977». "Restrictions on advertising 'serv[ e] to increase the difficulty of 
discovering the lowest cost seller ... and [reduce] the incentive to price competitively. '" Id. 
(quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 377). "Accordingly, 'where consumers have the benefit of price 
advertising, retail prices often are dramatically lower than they would be without 
advertising.'" Id. at 388-89 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 377); see also 1I\. Corporate Travel, 
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A market's firms, taken as a group, will typically benefit from 
suppressing such advertising competition, just as those same firms would 
benefit from suppressing price competition.47 Absent restrictions, advertising 
levels will be too high just as prices will be too low, compared to those that 
would jointly maximize profits of the competitors. However, just as the goal 
of efforts to differentiate products is to affect the non-cooperative market 
equilibrium among firms, so too, the goal of a restriction on advertising is 
also to allow firms the space to unilaterally charge higher prices than they 
would be able to successfully charge in a market in which well-informed 
customers purchased products viewed as being very similar. The goal of the 
ad bans is not to facilitate collusion over prices, but instead to permit 
individual firms, acting independently, to achieve higher prices and margins. 
In this way, the antitrust condemnation of agreements to restrict advertising 
mirrors the concerns under the unilateral effects doctrine of merger analysis:48 
in each case the collusive pricing is not directly at issue. Regardless of 
whether the concern is a merger or a cartel, the fear is the conduct's ultimate 
effect on a non-collusive market equilibrium. 
In sum, many attempts to control advertising cannot be interpreted as 
devices to facilitate a classic cartel agreement, but must instead be understood 
as designed to make consumer comparisons of the products offered by rival 
suppliers more difficult. This increased difficulty means that suppliers, acting 
independently, will choose higher prices than they would have if consumers 
had knowledge enough to shop and compare competing suppliers. The 
collusive agreement to restrict advertising is thus an agreement to affect non-
cooperative pricing outcomes. This argument is well-illustrated by the 
following examples. 
a. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona and related cases 
The concern that restrictions on price advertising will raise prices even 
when suppliers choose prices non-cooperatively is now widely accepted in 
law.49 In Bates v. State Bar Ass 'n,50 the Supreme Court remarked that the 
Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 889 F.2d 751,754 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he proposition that to forbid 
the advertising of discounts is to sct price (at least to influence it) ... [has] substantial support 
in both law and economics.") (emphasis in original). 
47. Finns conspiring to restrict price advertising receive an additional benefit by 
avoiding the cost of the advertising. 
48. See U.S. Dept. of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, § 2.2 (1992)(as amended April 8, 1997), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) 
~ 13, I 04, at 20,573-8. 
49. In a case concerned with a state's ban on advertising of liquor prices, the 
Supreme Court concluded that "common sense supports the conclusion that a prohibition 
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interest of consumers was served not only by rendering information to the 
individual,51 but also by making markets perform better: "[C]ommercial 
speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of 
products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the 
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system.,,52 This role is performed 
at least in part by stimulating competition: 
The ban on advertising serves to increase the difficulty of 
discovering the lowest cost seller of acceptable ability. As a result, 
to this extent attorneys are isolated from competition, and the 
incentive to price competitively is reduced . . . . It is entirely 
possible that advertising will serve to reduce, not advance, the cost 
oflegal services to the consumer. 53 
Justice Powell's spirited separate opinion in Bates emphasized the 
"individualized" nature of legal services, and suggested that while advertising 
of such services might have benefited some consumers, presumably through 
lower prices, many would have inevitably been misled.54 This 
individualization of services implied that lawyers would have found it 
difficult to establish and to effectively enforce a classic carte1.55 Thus, for 
against price advertising, like a collusive agreement among competitors to refrain from such 
advertising, will tend to mitigate competition and maintain prices at a higher level than would 
prevail in a completely free market." Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) 
(footnotes omitted). The state of Rhode Island, in support of its ban on price advertising, 
argued that such advertising, if permitted, would raise prices to lower eonsumption. Id. at 530 
(O'Connor, 1., concurring). 
50. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
51. The Court held that while commercial speech "may often carry information of 
import to significant issues of the day," and is thus deserving of protection similar to that of 
non-commercial speech, it is likely to have an even stronger impact on listeners. "The 
listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's eoncem for the free flow of commercial 
speech often may bc far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue." Id. at 364. 
Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 377. 
54. Id. at 391 (Powell & Stewart, J1., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
It has long been thOUght that price advertising of legal services inevitably will bc 
misleading because such services arc individualized with respect to content and 
quality and because the lay consumcr oflegal services usually does not know in 
advance the precise nature and scope of the services he requires. 
55. For example, lawyers could agree to fix their hourly fee, but a lawyer inclined 
to defect from the cartel could charge fewer hours for a particular matter. Still, there could 
be certain areas oflegal practice whcrc a classic cartel might be effective, such as agreed-upon 
minimum charges for routine divorce cases, or agreed-upon percentages to charge for 
administering an estate. These standardized matters were the focus of the advertising in Bates, 
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professional services we can reasonably conclude that the Court justified its 
decision to limit restrictions on price advertising in part because of 
advertising's impact on prices that are set non-cooperatively. Following 
Bates, a simple agreement to ban price advertising, even among professionals 
such as physicians,56 optometrists,57 pharmacists,58 or accountants,59 is clearly 
illegal. 
An agreement not to post gasoline price signs was held to be a per se 
violation of section I of the Sherman Act, even though the agreement did not 
extend to fixing the prices themselves-the proponents of the ban admitted 
that it was intended to stabilize prices, reducing the incidence of "price 
wars.',60 But for products less homogeneous than either liquor or gasoline, the 
illegality of agreements to control non-price advertising has been, and 
remains, somewhat more problematic. This illegality does not always derive 
from the Sherman Act-the advertising limitations imposed by state 
governments in Bates and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy were 
condemned as First Amendment violations of commercial free speech. But 
the language used to justify protection of such speech was, at least in part, 
economic. There could be occasions when a cartel's ban of advertising could 
help stabilize a cartel by making. discounting difficult, though, as noted 
above, advertising would generally help cartels through exposing prices to 
but had lawyers wished to enforce a cartel, they would have been better served by altering the 
rules to permit advertising. Note, however, that there have been attempts to fix prices for 
legal services. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
56. See Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), ajJ'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), 
ajJ'd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982) (order modified 99 F.T.C. 440 (1982), 100 F.T.C. 572 (1982) and 
114 F.T.C. 575 (1991». 
57. See Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988). For a 
cogent and pathbreaking analysis of the advertising and other restraints at issue, see John E. 
Kwoka, Jr., Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services, 74 AM. ECON. 
REv. 211 (1984), and Ronald S. Bond et aI., Self-Regulation in Optometry: The Impact on 
Price and Quality, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219 (1983). 
58. See Va. State Bd. of Ph arm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). Since the pharmacists dispensed standardized products, their case may have been 
more akin to advertising restrictions for gasoline and liquor than to other professional 
services. Id. at 773 n.25. 
59. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 113 F.T.C. 698 (1990). 
60. United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1961). 
While retail gasoline prices are susceptible to price fixing such price fixing is facilitated when 
cartel members can readily observe the prices set by competitors. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hayter Oil, 51 F.3d 1265 (6th Cir. 1995); Coleman v. Cannon Oil, 849 F. Supp. 1458 (M.D. 
Ala. 1993). Transparent pricing means that any attempt to cheat on the cartel agreement can 
be uncovered quickly and punished effectively. The prospect offew benefits and substantial 
costs from cheating will tend to stabilize the cartel. A ban on price advertising, by reducing 
the transparency of prices, is much more likely to raise prices determined non-cooperatively 
than it is to facilitate classic collusion. 
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inspection. The difference in economic effects from an agreement to fix 
prices shows that advertising restrictions do not belong under the heading of 
classic collusion. 
b. California Dental Association 
The Supreme Court returned recently to the competitive effects of 
advertising. The occasion was a Federal Trade Commission challenge to a 
series of rules issued by the California Dental Association (CDA) that 
allegedly restricted its members' price and quality advertising.61 The CDA, 
which included about three-quarters of dentists practicing in California, 
issued a Code of Ethics that purported to allow dentists to engage in truthful 
advertising, and only to prohibit advertising that was "false or misleading in 
any material respect; ,,62 the Code condemned advertising as false or 
misleading unless it contained a large amount of specified information.63 The 
issue before the Court, however, was the manner in which the CDA 
implemented this provision-through advisory opinions, guidelines, 
enforcement policies, and reviews of membership applications. The FTC 
held that the manner in which the CDA implemented its Code of Ethics 
effectively prevented the advertising of pricing, discount and quality 
information, and thereby harmed competition between dentists.64 
The Commission treated the CDA's restriction against discount 
advertising as per se illegal and, additionally, condemned the rules under the 
abbreviated or "quick look" approach. On review, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit agreed that the Code was a "naked" restraint on price 
competition, and therefore deserving of condemnation under the "quick look" 
approach, though per se illegality was not deemed appropriate. The Supreme 
61. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
62. Id. at 760. 
63. Id. at 761-62 n.2. As Justice Breyer noted in his opinion, joined by three other 
Justices who concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority opinion, the 
Commission had found evidence that the CDA had denied membership to dentists wishing 
to advertise: 
"reasonable fees quoted in advance", "major savings", or "making teeth cleaning 
... 'inexpensive. '" [The FTC] referred to testimony that "across-the-board 
discount advertising in literal complianee with the requirements 'would probably 
take two pages in the telephone book' and '[n]obody is going to really advertise 
in that fashion. '" And it pointed to many instances in which the Dental 
Association suppressed such advertising claims as "we guarantee all dental work 
for 1 year," "latest in cosmetic dentistry," and "gentle dentistry in a caring 
environment." 
Id. at 783-84 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omited). 
64. Id. at 762-63. 
2000:941 The Three Types of Collusion 957 
Court, however, held that it was not "intuitively obvious" that the restraints 
in question were anticompetitive, and hence deserved to be examined under 
the rule of reason approach. The Court remanded the case with instructions 
to analyze whether the CDA's asserted justifications for the Code were valid 
and whether the restraints had the effect of harming competition.65 
Upon reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit completely reversed course. It 
"closely examined the record under the rule of reason" and "concluded that 
the Federal Trade Commission failed to prove that the restrictions were 
. .. ,,66 
anttcompetttIve. 
The market for dental services is surely one in which it is difficult for 
"customers or potential competitors to get and verify information about the 
price and availability of services ... ,,;67 advertising can provide such 
information. The opinions in California Dental Ass 'n are remarkable both for 
the great gulf between the majority's attitude toward advertising and that of 
Breyer's dissent, as well as for the striking changes in attitudes toward 
advertising that each of the opinions reflect. 
In reading the opinions, it is important to distinguish between 
advertising of prices and advertising of product characteristics, such as the 
quality of services offered. Price advertising, including the advertising of 
discounts, provides customers with information about a search 
characteristic-one that they can verify before acquiring the product in 
question. The majority was deeply suspicious of such advertising, arguing, 
in essence, that a little knowledge could be a dangerous thing. The CDA rules 
barred across-the-board discounts. The Court accepted that such discounts, 
if permitted, could have constituted "misleading or irrelevant advertising.,,68 
To the Court, the potential consequences of misleading advertising included 
the possibility that '''dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of 
the market.",69 The result eould have been, in the Court's view, one in which 
across-the-board discount advertising drove more accurate advertising out of 
the market. 
65. Justice Breyer and the other three Justices dissented on this issue, holding that 
a "quick look" was enough to condemn the restraints at issue. The Court's response was that 
the look needed to be "lingering," though apparently it was unlikely to be necessary to linger 
long. The Court found the eight-page court of appeals decision to be inadequate, but, by 
comparison, deemed Justice Breyer's fourteen-page treatment both "lingering" and 
"painstaking." Id. at 779. 
66 Calif. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 224 F.3d 942,943 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(hereinafter "Cal. Dental Ass 'n If'). 
67. Cal. Dental Ass 'n. 526 U.S. at 772. 
68. Id. at 773. 
69. Id. at 775 (quoting George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ",' Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970». 
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While it is surely true that advertising across-the-board discounts could 
be misleading, especially in an information-poor environment/o the Court's 
skepticism about such information represents a substantial change in the legal 
treatment of price-related advertising. Advertising of discounts and other 
price terms has long been treated nearly on a par with straightforward price 
advertising. The FTC felt comfortable enough with its treatment of advertised 
price discounts to introduce its "quick look" approach in Massachusetts 
Board of Registration in Optometry (HMass. Board,,)/1 a case that stressed 
a ban on discounts. 
If the Court's opinion in California Dental represented a sharp tum 
away from the position that advertising of price terms would necessarily 
lower prices in a non-cooperative equilibrium setting and thereby benefit 
consumers, Justice Breyer's dissent was an equally bold move in the other 
direction, endorsing the importance for competition not only of price-related 
advertising, but also that for quality. Justice Breyer's treatment of price-
related advertising is focused on the unilateral decisions of suppliers: 
An agreement not to advertise that a fee is reasonable, that service 
is inexpensive, or that a customer will receive a discount makes it 
more difficult for a dentist to inform customers that he charges a 
lower price. If the customer does not know about a lower price, he 
will find it more difficult to buy lower price service. That fact, in 
turn, makes it less likely that a dentist will obtain more customers 
by offering lower prices. And that likelihood means that dentists 
will prove less likely to offer lower prices.72 
This much he regards as "obvious." When he turns to advertising of service 
quality, his arguments are not altered much: "1 do not believe it possible to 
deny the anti competitive tendencies [of service quality advertising restrictions 
that] I have mentioned.,,73 What are these tendencies? Suppression of quality 
advertising will reduce the amount of quality provided: 
[S]ome parents may ... want to know that a particular dentist 
makes a point of "gentle care." Others may want to know about 1-
70. Indeed, even if the product in question were far more standardized than a 
profcssional service, opportunities for deception would remain. A price discount is clearly 
meaningless without knowledge of the base to which the discount is applied: a 20% discount 
from a price that is 25% above the price charged by rival suppliers has no effect whatsoever. 
71. Mass. Ed. o/Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. at 606. 
72. Cal. Dental Ass 'n, 526 U.S. at 784 (Breyer, 1., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
73. Id. at 786. 
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year dental work guarantees. To restrict that kind of service quality 
advertisement is to restrict competition over the quality of service 
itself, for, unless consumers know, they may not purchase, and 
dentists may not compete to supply that which will make little 
difference to the demand for their services.74 
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Justice Breyer's encomiums for quality advertising are interesting in 
good part because of what they say about how attitudes toward advertising 
have changed. The assertions themselves are unobjectionable-indeed, how 
can a dentist compete on a quality dimension if customers cannot be readily 
informed about the level of quality offered? Yet it is also true that the 
motivation of California dentists for promising "gentle care" or the "latest in 
cosmetic dentistry" need not be limited to increasing output. These are classic 
product differentiation claims. The dentist that succeeds in convincing 
consumers that she has a special ability to provide a radiant smile is hardly 
different from the toothpaste manufacturer promising whiter teeth. If 
successful, such advertising will differentiate suppliers in either case, and, in 
consequence, will result in higher prices resulting directly from softened 
competitive pressures on the prices of individual dentists. This result can be 
obtained whether or not the advertised claims of improved quality can be 
verified, as long as customers credit them and, of course, if customers 
dismissed the claims, they would cease to be made. 
Note, however, that the quality claims addressed by Justice Breyer were 
the subject of a CDA ban.75 If the claims merely increased product 
differentiation and thereby reduced competition among dentists, the CDA 
would not have found it in its economic interest to impose the restrictions. 
That is, we conclude from the existence of an agreement among rivals that 
whatever quantity or differentiation-induced price increases the advertising 
may have permitted were expected by the CDA: to be more than offset by the 
cost of the services promised and the cost of the advertisements themselves. 
It is the existence of the agreement to suppress competition, rather than the 
itiherent desirability of the advertising itself that raises, or should raise, 
antitrust objections. 
The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand adopted the skepticism of the 
Supreme Court's majority with a vengeance. The court held that "the case 
74. Id. at 785. 
75. We agree with Justice Breyer and recognize that these claims concern the 
quality of services offered, respecting that the argument applies to claims intended to 
differentiate offerings as weIl as purely informational assertions. A claim of "gentle care" 
could refer to the willingness of the dentist to subject the patient to large doses of anesthetic 
at the first sign of tenderness-a practice that might increase risks in ways not necessarily 
consistent with higher quality care. 
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hinged on the actual economic consequences of the COA's restrictions.,,76 
These economic consequences were not established in the record to the 
court's satisfaction.77 Moreover, the court found the COA's arguments on 
behalf of the potential procompetitive impact of advertising restrictions to be 
plausible. In markets in which information about product quality is difficult 
to verify, information provided through advertising by obviously self-
interested providers may mislead poorly informed consumers. That is, added 
information is not necessarily a good thing, because that information may 
deceive. Does advertising lower prices? The evidence from the optometry 
market clearly indicates that it does. 78 But the court claimed that "the 
optometry market is of extremely limited value in helping us discern the 
economic effects of CO A's restrictions.,,79 The FTC, in its quick look at the 
CDA restrictions had failed to provide "substantial evidence of the 
anticompetitive nature of the COA's advertising restrictions.,,8o Its argument 
was too reliant on extrapolation of results from markets for other professional 
services. 
With the FTC's evidence discounted, the court viewed with favor the 
argument that the COA restriction could benefit consumers. By restricting 
some forms of advertising, the COA restrictions could, in principle, make the 
services provided by dentists more directly comparable, thereby actually 
lowering search costs. "[T]he restrictions create a kind of network externality 
by mandating a common language to be used by those CDA members who 
advertise discounts. As a result, a consumer's cost of searching for the less 
expensive service would be reduced.,,81 Although no evidence is provided 
to support the applicability of this argument to the dental services market, 
after considering the argument, the court professes itself "persuaded that 
COA's restrictions do mitigate some of the information asymmetries that 
exist in the market for dental services.,,82 
The argument that one must carefully control information provision to 
ensure that consumers can compare effectively is one that should require 
substantial empirical support to be given substantial weight in deliberations 
over the effects of advertising restrictions. A recent study of the dental 
services market suggests that attempts to control quality through restrictive 
licensure have increased earnings of service providers and prices paid by 
76. Calif. Dental Ass 'n 11,224 F.3d at 597. 
77. See id. 
78. The court could have added Kwoka's work to the references it considered in 
support of the conclusion. See Kwoka, supra note 57. 
79. Calif. Dental Ass 'n II, 224 F.3d at 950. 
80. Id. at 952. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 953. 
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consumers, with no impact on the quality of services provided.83 A study of 
health information provided through advertising by self-interested product 
supplies indicates that such information has resulted in desirable changes in 
consumer behavior.84 While the FTC may have provided insufficient support 
for its position that the CDA restrictions were anticompetititve, a closer look 
will likely reveal that they indeed had anticompetitive effects with little, if 
any benefit for product quality. 
The Ninth Circuit opinion on remand in California Dental Ass 'n makes 
it clear that agreements to change the rules of competition need not 
necessarily result in a diminution of competition or in the loss of consumer 
welfare.85 The FTC was obviously too ready to conclude on the basis of little 
direct evidence that the CDA's restrictions on advertising were harmful. 
Nevertheless, our reading of the economics and evidence on advertising 
restrictions suggests that they are far more likely than not to harm 
competition. 
c. Fastline Publications 
The examples of bans on advertising have so far been restricted to 
associations of professionals. These examples have been chosen to 
demonstrate the distinction between classic collusion and agreements 
designed to affect prices chosen independently since, given the provider-
specific nature of most professional services, effective price collusion in such 
markets is unlikely.86 Motor vehicle dealers provide a different set of 
examples, because such dealers offer standardized merchandise. Yet, since 
prices in most motor vehicle retail markets are individually negotiated and 
cannot therefore be monitored effectively by rivals, pricing collusion is likely 
to be rare in these markets as well. Such markets also provide numerous 
examples of agreements intended to change the rules under which price 
competition takes place, thereby softening competition. 
One recent example, Fastline Publications, concerned an agreement 
among farm equipment dealers to engage in a boycott to force a publisher of 
advertising circulars to remove price information from its mailing to 
farmers. 87 According to the FTC's staff analysis of the case, "[t]he price 
83. Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kurdle, Does Regulation Affect Economic 
Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry, 43 J. OF LAW & EeON. 547 (2000). 
84. Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information and Advertising: The Case 
of Fat Consumption in the United States, AM. EeoN. REv., Jan. 6-8,1995, at 91-95. 
85. We discuss examples of rules that enhance competition below in Part IV. See 
infra, text accompanying note 208. 
86. But see Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
87. 1998 FTC LEXIS 55 (FTC May 11,1998). 
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advertisements were, among other things, facilitating downward pressure on 
prices for new farm equipment.,,88 Fastline's principal business consisted of 
distributing a series of picture buying guides for new and used farm 
equipment to farmers at no charge. These guides were funded by advertising 
fees paid by the dealers whose products appeared within. Fastline's 
promotional materials suggested that the prices included in its circulars 
increased the circulars' attraction to farmers, permitting them to shop at a 
lower cost than would otherwise have been possible.89 
In 1991, several Kentucky farm equipment dealers complained 
individually to Fastline about dealer advertisements that included discount 
prices for new farm equipment. Acting through their dealer association, and 
backed by the threat of withholding their advertising, the Kentucky dealers 
obtained an agreement from Fastline not to accept advertisements that 
included prices for new equipment. The dealers did not object to, and indeed 
apparently welcomed, circulars that provided price and other information 
about used equipment and non-price information about new equipment. Such 
information, particularly that concerning the availability of new equipment, 
need not increase competition markedly, and could indeed have left 
consumers worse off than they would have been without the information.90 
88. [d. 
89. Fastline offered testimonials from farmers, excerpts of which included: "I love 
looking for a good deal. The pictures are great!"; "I love the photos in Fastline. 1 like to shop 
and compare."; and "Not having Fastline is like going to an elevator and not having a 
directory." FastIine Publ'ns, What Do Farmers Say About Fastline?, at 
http://www.fastiinepublications.comlCreadertestimonials.asp (last visited Nov. 12,2000). 
90. Such advertising could have benefited dealers to the detriment of consumers. 
Consider a simple example of how information could actually harm consumers. Suppose the 
marginal cost of selling a farm implement is $10,000, but that farmers are willing to pay up 
to $13,000 for a unit of the implement in question. Suppose also that the implement comes 
in two varieties, red and green, that one-half of the farmers in the market prefer each type, and 
that the reservation price per unit is reduced by $500 for the non-preferred unit. That is, if 1 
prefer green units, 1 am willing to pay $13,000 for a green unit and $12,500 for a red unit. 
Finally, suppose that farmers know that there are two implement dealers (one green and one 
red) in their community, but they do not know which type of implement each dealer offers. 
We suppose that each farmer chooses to visit a single dealer at random, but that the farmers 
do not shop after visiting one dealer. Also supposc that there is no effective advertising 
mechanism available. 
Since the farmers do not shop, each dealer expects that on average one half of its 
customers will be willing to pay $13,000 and one half will be willing to pay $ 12,500. We will 
also assume that the farmers do not readily reveal their willingness to pay, so that dealers 
must charge all farmers the same price. That price, clearly, will be $12,500. Each of the 
farmers who is matched with his preferred color gets a surplus of $500, while the other 
farmers receive no surplus. 
Now suppose that a third party begins to distribute an advertising circular, and the 
dealers are forced by competition to use it. Each places ads that indicate the color it offers. 
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The situation changes when prices are advertised. In practice, 
prospective farm equipment customers are apt to carry on at least some 
search, but would likely differ both in terms of search costs and in their 
interest in seeking better deals. Faced with informed customers, circulars in 
hand, dealers would be willing to cut prices below their consumers' 
willingness to pay, particularly if they could retain those customers without 
extending similar discounts to less well-informed customers. The result is 
price discrimination with competition for the well-informed, dragging prices 
down for those customers.91 
The Fastline case illustrates that non-price advertising might not always 
be an adequate method of imparting necessary information to consumers. By 
contrast, price advertising makes it easier to reach customers who would not 
ordinarily visit a particular firm, and encourages discounts to attract those 
customers. However, as advertising increases, the fraction of the market 
receiving the discount offers grows. Eventually firms can experience erosion 
of their customer bases to such an extent that rivals offering selective 
discounts will need to respond with price cuts to the most lucrative of their 
customers. In this way, prices will be eroded even if the rivals did not collude 
over prices before the onset of advertising. Thus while individual dealers may 
wish to offer and to advertise discounts to otherwise committed (and high 
price) customers from rivals, the collective interest of dealers will be to 
suppress such advertising, thereby limiting discrimination. Still, dealers have 
Farmers who prefer green go to the green dealer, who now knows that all customers who walk 
in the door are willing to pay $13,000. Hence all customers will receive no surplus, even 
though the matching between customers and implements is improved. (We are assuming that 
the dealers can only charge a single price, since they cannot determine consumer willingness 
to pay on a case by case basis, and that they carry only one color of equipment.) The 
allocation of resources is better--each customer receives his preferred variant-but all surplus 
accrues to the dealers. Here information that induces customers to sort themselves benefits 
dealers and so is likely to be provided voluntarily by those dealers. 
We have kept this example simple by ignoring a numbcr of issues. Will both firms (or, 
for that matter, either firm) choose to advertise, when advertising by one, say green, tells red 
consumers to try the other? If prices are advertised, do consumers benefit? Advertising of 
prices and product characteristics clearly benefits customers compared to the $13,000 
equilibrium that emerges from advertising of product characteristics alone. However, the 
simplifying assumptions we have made to understand advertising that directs customers to 
prcferred characteristics also rule out a pure strategy equilibrium for prices. Assuming 
customers know enough to pick the dealers offering their preferred products, dealers will 
clearly benefit from, and consumers will be harmed by, an agreement not to advertise prices. 
91. Price discrimination can also encourage dealers to compete for customers who 
do not favor that dealer's products. Referring to the example in the previous footnote, a red 
dealer is more likely to extend discounts to green customers if it can do so without passing 
the savings on to red customers. 
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sometimes moved beyond limitations on advertising to limit the ways in 
which intense competition occurs. 
2. OTHER AGREEMENTS TO RAISE CONSUMERS' SEARCH COSTS 
Advertising can serve either to insulate one firm from its rivals by 
differentiating its products or to bring rivals into closer proximity by 
providing information with which consumers can more easily comparison 
shop. As we have seen, firms will often wish to agree to limit advertising that 
has the latter effect. Their interest in such agreements will extend to attempts 
to increase the costs of comparative information to consumers, thereby 
preserving differentiation. We consider several such agreements here, each 
of which was designed to make it harder for consumers to shop multiple 
suppliers. The first case, Detroit Auto Dealers Ass 'n,92 involved an agreement 
to make it more difficult for consumers to shop. The next two, Dillon Co. 93 
and Santa Clara Motor Vehicle Dealers Ass 'n,94 were agreements to prevent 
third parties from providing information to consumers. ES Development, Inc. 
v. RWM Enterprises, Inc. 95 involved an attempt by dealers to prevent the 
emergence of a form of retailing conducive to consumer shopping and price 
comparison. Finally, National Society of Professional Engineer/6 was an 
attempt by members of a profession to prevent consumers from shopping 
prior to investing substantial unrecoverable resources in dealing with a 
particular supplier. 
a. Detroit Auto Dealers Association 
In 1973, a number of Detroit-area automobile dealers, faced with the 
threat of a union organizing drive, agreed to close their dealerships on 
Saturdays and to otherwise restrict their hours of operation. This agreement 
resulted in a 1984 FTC complaint charging that members of the Detroit Auto 
Dealers Association (DADA) had thereby violated section 5 of the FTC 
92. III F.T.C. 417 (1989). 
93. 102 F.T.C. 1299 (1983). 
94. Santa Clara County Motor Car Dealers Assoeiation; Proposed Consent 
Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,959 (Fed. Trade 
Comm'n Aug. 4, 1995). 
95. 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991). 
96 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
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Act.97 The Commission's Order required that DADA members refrain from 
discussing hours with one another, and that the dealers remain open for a 
minimum of sixty-four hours per week.98 
This DADA agreement appears to have been intended to increase 
consumer search costs, thereby separating dealers more effectively from one 
another, and hence raising non-cooperative equilibrium prices. Here, even 
more so than in the Fastline case, it is apparent that the restriction on hours 
was not intended to further a collusive agreement. With individually 
negotiated prices set not only by each dealer, but separately for each 
customer, and with those negotiated prices likely to remain secret, the 
possibility of an effective cartel was small. The goal of the restrictions was 
to raise non-cooperative eqUilibrium prices that the dealers set individually 
by suppressing competition. 
The dealers apparently viewed the hours restriction in exactly this way. 
The FTC case included letters from the dealers demonstrating that they 
"expected the hours restriction to benefit them by limiting comparison 
shopping.,,99 This limitation arose from the raised cost of search and was 
expected to result directly in higher prices: "with fewer shopping hours, the 
public can devote less time to shopping, and consequently forcing down 
prices. ,,100 
Not all commentators agree that agreements to restrict hours such as that 
at issue in the DADA case are distinct from classic cartels. For example, in 
a section entitled Avoidance of Unreal Distinctions, Robert Bork argued as 
97. Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, III F.T.C. 417 (1989). The FTC entered into a 
consent agreement with a majority of the DADA members, those that did not have labor 
agreements. For a history of the case, see Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remaining Dealers in Detroit 
Auto Dealers Case Agree to Sellle, at http://www.ftc.gov/opalI997/9703/dada-97.htm(Mar. 
14, 1997). 
98. Detroit Auto Dealers, III F.T.C. at 513-14. Implementation of the 
Commission's Order entailed numerous complexities. 
99. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457, 477 (6th Cir. 1992) (Ryan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race 
Discrimination In Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991). Ayres provides 
the following example closely tracking our analysis: 
One dealer, interviewed informally, espoused a desire to close his showroom in 
the cvening, if his competitors would follow suit. Although forcing consumers 
to purchase at inconvcnient times would seem to reduce the demand for cars, the 
dealer felt that restricting showroom hours would also reduce the amount of 
search that buyers undertake. Thus, the dealer believed that although he might not 
get as many people in his showroom, he would have less competition for those 
who did arrive. 
/d. at 848 n.90. 
100. See Detroit Auto Dealers Ass 'n, 955 F.2d at 477 (Ryan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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follows: 
It is, presumably, more likely that a judge in the Brandeis tradition 
would uphold an agreement by automobile dealers to close on 
Sundays than an agreement by the same dealers to add $200 to the 
price of each car. Yet there is no difference between the cases. 
Both are limitations upon competition whose sole purpose is to 
increase the dealers' income by restricting output. The output in 
one case is the number of cars sold (which will decrease with the 
raised price); the output in the other case is the provision of 
convenience of shopping to consumers (which will decrease with 
the Sunday closing).lol 
We disagree. The extra $200 per car agreed upon by dealers in Bork's 
example of classic collusion flows directly into the pockets of the dealers. 102 
The quality of the cars is unaltered, and no impact on demand (as opposed to 
quantity demanded) occurs. When hours are restricted, resulting in lessened 
"convenience of shopping," the direct benefit to dealers is a reduction in the 
cost of providing services. If the dealers' goal was merely to reduce output 
(defined in terms of hours of shopping), they could have as easily agreed to 
close on Wednesdays. In this case, however, the benefits of cost reduction. 
would be difficult to retain. The association would face the problem of 
ensuring that competition would not force the price down, transferring any 
cost savings to consumers. 103 In the actual case, by contrast, the benefit to 
dealers of shorter hours required a reduction in the intensity of price 
competition. The DADA restriction did not fix prices, but instead reduced 
shopping convenience, thereby altering the way in which individual prices 
were negotiated. For all these reasons, this case belongs in a category distinct 
from classic "Type I" collusion. 
\0 I. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 85 (1978). 
102. This assumes that a traditional cartel among auto dealers would have been 
effective, an unlikely outcome for this market. 
103. For a casc that more closely fits the Bork argument, see Tennessee v. Highland 
Mem '[ Cemetery, 489 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). In that case, four Knoxville area 
cemeteries agreed not to perform burials on Sundays. The Court remarked that "'[i]t is 
difficult to believe that concerns about competition did not playa key role in the agreement. 
The agreement, in purpose and effect, was an anticompetitive restraint of trade." ld. at 68. 
Such an agreement would reduce the costs of burials to cemetery owners but the 
corresponding reduction in the quality of services provided would not translate into more than 
a minor dee line in demand, assuming that substitutes for burial are very imperfect. To the 
extent that consumers of burial services were required to choose burial days (Monday, as 
opposed to Sunday) that resulted in lowered attendance or lost work days, welfare would 
diminish. 
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b. Dillon Co. 
Other cases involving attempts to raise consumer search costs do not 
even give rise to superficially plausible arguments that their purpose is to 
reduce selling costs. Consider Dillon CO.,I04 a case that involved concerted 
action to prevent price checking at grocery stores. TeleCable, a Springfield, 
Missouri cable television supplier, hired Vector Enterprises to collect price 
information on a sample of approximately eighty grocery products at five 
grocery store chains, including the largest chains in Springfield. lOS The cable 
station broadcast comparative grocery pricing information for approximately 
a year. The five grocery stores then agreed to act in concert to prevent 
Vector's collection efforts, and simultaneously implemented actions that 
effectively prevented Vector from engaging in comparative grocery price 
checking. 106 The groceries did not obtain any cost-saving benefits from their. 
agreement-all of the costs of collecting and disseminating infonnation were 
incurred by Vector and paid for by TeleCable. 
When the agreement took hold, the cable system was unable to run 
comparative grocery pricing. It therefore terminated its contract with Vector. 
The FTC sued, charging that the retailers' collective action restrained grocery 
price competition. 107 In a Consent Order, the defendant agreed to stop 
Interfering with Vector's price checking. !Os Since the only benefit of the 
agreement to the cartel was to impair consumer search so as to reduce 
competitive pressures on the groceries, the agreement fits clearly into our new 
category of collusive activity to manipulate the rules under which competition 
takes place. 
c. Santa Clara Car Dealers 
The Detroit Auto Dealers were interested in agreeing to control their 
own behavior in order to make shopping more costly, thereby providing each 
dealer with more insulation from competition. When an outsider provides 
shopping guidance to consumers, the results are similar-the dealers will 
104. 102 F.T.C. 1299 (1983). 
105. Eighty products represents only a small fraction of the more than 10,000 stock-
keeping units (individual items) carried by a modem supermarket. 
106. [d. at 1300. The five stores implemented a variety of measures to prevent Vector 
from effectively checking prices. These included directly preventing Vector from entering to 
check prices, and requiring Vector to purchase the items in question, which would have cost 
Vector more than it received from the cable television station for its research. /d. 
107. [d. at 1301. 
108. [d. at 1302. The defendant also agreed to other remedies. [d. at 1303-06. 
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wish to suppress such information. The Santa Clara County Motor Car 
Dealers Association conducted a boycott of a newspaper that ran an article 
offering customers information on how to negotiate for new cars effectively. 
A local newspaper, the San Jose Mercury News, ran a feature article in their 
weekly automotive section titled, "A Car Buyer's Guide to Sanity."I09 The 
article explained to consumers how to read a factory invoice and other 
techniques they could use to better negotiate for new cars. 
In response, the Association's members met and allegedly agreed to 
cancel approximately $1 million worth of advertising in the newspaper (auto 
advertising had been the newspaper's fourth largest source of revenue). The 
FTC asserted that the "boycott" or punishment occurred pursuant to an 
agreement and was anticompetitive because it "restrain[ed] competition 
among dealers and chi11[ed] the publication of important consumer 
information."llo Further, the boycott could have had the effect of inhibiting 
comparison-shopping and thus could have increased consumer search costs. 
In a Consent Order, the Association agreed not to participate in any future 
boycott of any media and to other remedial provisions as well. III As in our 
other motor vehicle cases, there was no suggestion that the dealers were 
colluding on prices. They instead wished to suppress competitive pressure to 
meet prices of rivals. 
d. ES Development 
ES Development, Inc. v. RWM Enterprises, Inc. 112 involved an attempt 
by car dealers to prevent the emergence of a car mall that would have 
provided "one-stop shopping" for car buyers. ES Development (ESD), a real 
estate development corporation, was attempting to open an automobile mall, 
the first of its kind in the St. Louis area. I \3 The mall would have benefited 
consumers since they would no longer have had to travel from one 
manufacturer's dealers to those of another in order to comparison shop. 114 It 
109. A Car Buyer's Guide to Sanity: Here's a Low-Price, Low-Stress Route to 
Getting the Most for Your Dollar, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 22, 1994. 
110. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Santa Clara County Auto Dealers 
Association Settles Charges over Alleged Advertising Boycott, FTC File No. 941 0107 (Aug. 
I, 1995), at http://www.ftc.gov/opalI995/9508/scautoad.htm (Aug. I, 1995). 
III. Santa Clara County Motor Car Dealers Association; Proposed Consent 
Agreement With Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,959 (Fed. Trade Comm'n 
Aug. 4, 1995). 
112. 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991). 
113. [d. at 550. 
114. Presumably the mall would only contain one franchise for each manufacturers' 
product. Consumers would still have to go to a number oflocations to engage in intrabrand 
shopping. However, the mall would be a great benefit for consumers unsure of what type of 
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was also hoped that participating dealers would benefit since they could have 
shared service facilities and advertising expenses, 11 5 and secured a large 
number of customers. 
The potential of such a mall emerging posed a substantial problem for 
existing dealers. Apart from operational efficiencies accruing to dealers from 
their close proximity to one another, such a mall, like a shopping center or 
district, would attract consumers both because of the convenience of 
comparing alternative automotive offerings and because the competition 
among dealers will result in lower prices. Each individual dealer might have 
wished to maintain separation from rivals, but were the mall to become 
viable, dealers would have preferred to follow the demand. I 16 ESD attempted 
to secure tenants for its mall by contacting a number of automobile 
manufacturers, several of which expressed initial interest in the project. 117 
The manufacturers' interests would have been served by efficient, 
competitive distribution that the mall could provide-product differentiation 
could be handled through advertising. ESD separately contacted local 
dealerships about the possibility of relocating to the mall, and several also 
expressed initial interest. lls Some area dealers, however, developed a 
concern over the proposed mall's "one stop shopping" concept. 119 These 
concerns led representatives of nine area car dealerships, all of which were 
located within ten miles of the proposed mall, to meet. 120 Each of the nine 
vehicle to purchase. 
115. !d. 
116. Operators of malls and trade shows, hoping to incrcase their attractiveness to 
potential exhibitors, may try to suppress some of the price competition that would emerge 
without their intervention. See, e.g., Denny's Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217 
(7th Cir. 1993). Dealers participating in a boat show complained to the organizer that 
Denny's was a price cutter who would encourage consumers to shop elsewhere and then come 
to the Denny's display, where Denny's would meet or beat the best price obtained c1sewhere. 
!d. at 1220. The resulting competition made the boat show much less attractive for the other 
dealers. The show's organizer, responding to complaints, refused to permit Denny's to renew 
its contract to participate in thc show. !d. Given that the existence of an agreement between 
the show's organizer and the remaining boat dealers was granted for purposes of summary 
judgment, the court of appeals held that an agreement to keep Denny's out in order to reduce 
price competition was a per se violation of section I of the Sherman Act. !d. at 1222. While 
the result was doubtful (the show was one of many outlets for boats in Central Indiana), the 
agrecmcnt was clearly one intended to alter the terms of price competition, rather than one 
to fix prices. 
117. ES Dev., 939 F.2d at 550. 
118. Id. at 55\. 
119. Id. 
120. There were eight representatives in attendance at the mecting, but one 
represented two dealerships. At least one other dealership owner attended, but left after 
learning that the group intended to act in concert to oppose the mall. Id. at 551 n.3. 
970 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
dealerships operated under franchise agreements that gave it certain rights to 
object if the manufacturer attempted to grant another dealership within its 
market area. If the dealers exercised their procedural rights to object they 
could delay their manufacturers' decisions to award new franchisees by 
several months or even longer. 121 
The dealers attending the meeting agreed that each would exercise its 
contractual rights of protest against the award of new dealerships.122 They 
formed a group (the Dealers Alliance) and devised a form protest letter that 
each could send to its respective manufacturer. 123 "Most, if not all," of the 
dealers sent substantially identical form letters to their respective automobile 
manufacturers. I 24 These manufacturers thereafter terminated negotiations with 
ESD, often citing the form letters and the dealers' threats of litigation as the 
reason. 125 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the actions of the 
Dealers Alliance were a violation of section I of the Sherman Act. The court 
found that the agreement went "well beyond" the legitimate individual 
interests of the dealers in protecting their franchise against the establishment 
of another in close proximity. Rather, their concern was with the very 
existence of the mall, with its "one-stop shopping" concept. 126 While it would 
have been legal for each dealer to assert its rights individually to protest the 
mall, the actions became illegal "when incorporated into a conspiracy to 
restrain trade.,,127 Although no individual dealer's actions could have 
prevented the formation of the car mall, their collective action was found to 
have had that power. 128 
Any dealer seriously considering whether to join the mall129 would have 
had a complex decision to make because after it joined it would be competing 
121. /d.at551. 
122. Id. The Dealers Alliance also drafted a statement of purpose that read, in part: 
"The purpose of the Dealers Alliance is to explore and advance areas of common and 
individual dealer concern with respeet to [the new] Auto Mal\." Id. 
123. /d. at 552. 
124. /d. 
125. /d. at 554. 
126. /d. 
127. /d. at 555 (citation omitted). 
128. /d. Without market power the boycott could not have had an anticompetitive 
effect. Our analysis assumes that the boycotting dealers had market power. 
129. The ESD mall would have competed with any area dealer that did not join. The 
collective decision of the Dealers Alliance to boycott the formation of the mall made it much 
less likely that it would ever be formed. Therefore, the boycott had in part "raising rivals' 
costs" attributes-{)ne significant effect of the boycott was to prevent the emergence of a new, 
lower cost, more efficient method of competition, in effect to infinitely raise the costs of 
prospective rivals. 
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under markedly new circumstances. If a dealer joined the mall it would have 
faced the prospect of reduced profit margins since its customers could have 
engaged in comparative shopping more easily. The very existence of the mall 
concept therefore changed the conditions of competition in a way that might 
well have harmed the dealer.!30 
On the other hand, suppose that a particular dealer declined to join the 
mall, yet the mall nevertheless came into existence. The mall could 
significantly hurt the non-participating dealers since it was located in the 
same area and offered the "one-stop shopping" concept and other potential 
efficiencies. 
A boycott solved the dealers' quandary. A car mall requires a minimum 
number of tenants to be viable.!3! The boycott could significantly decrease 
the probability that the mall would ever be formed since it would be likely to 
prevent the mall from reaching minimum viable scale. A boycott could 
prevent the risks that the new mall would bring to the old competitive 
equilibrium. It prevented a significant change in the nature of the competition 
that characterized the industry. 
e. National Society of Professional Engineers 
The Supreme Court considered a system of solicitation restraints in 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States. \32 Before a 
customer selected an engineer, the customer often had to spend a considerable 
amount of time working with that engineer until both parties were satisfied 
that the engineer understood the precise needs of that customer. Yet, the 
Society's canons of ethics prevented engineers from engaging in competitive 
bidding!33 and from negotiating or even discussing "prices with potential 
customers until after negotiations [had] resulted in the initial selection of an 
engineer.,,!34 After the engineer had quoted prices to the customer, the 
customer was free to negotiate with that engineer!35 or to reject that 
engineer's proposal and start over with another engineer.!36 However, this 
130. On the other hand, the mall concept might have attracted significantly more 
customers and could have enabled the dealer to save advertising and service costs. Whether 
joining made sense for a particular dealer also depended upon the rental terms that ESD was 
asking for, as well as that dealer's belief as to whether it would; on average, gain or lose from 
more vigorous competition with other dealers. 
131. /d. at 554 n.4. 
132. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
133. /d. at 681. 
134. /d. at 692. 
135. /d. at 693 n.19. 
136. /d. at 684. 
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often meant a considerable delay and expenditure of time on the part of the 
customer. 
The Court held that the ethical canon "operate[ d) as an absolute ban on 
competitive bidding, applying with equal force to both complicated and 
simple projects and to both inexperienced and sophisticated customers ... 
and substantially deprive[d] the customer of 'the ability to utilize and 
compare prices in selecting engineering services. ",137 The Court rejected 
defendants' arguments that the restrictions were needed to guard the public 
safety.138 The Court also observed that the canon had effectively transformed 
potential price negotiations between a buyer and many potential sellers into 
a bilateral negotiation between a buyer and one seller.139 There was no claim 
that the Society "tried to fix specific fees, or even a specific method of 
calculating fees,,,140 nor did the rules at issue transform a competitive market 
into one where the engineer was in a monopoly position. After all, customers 
could, at the very end of the process, opt to start the process over with a new 
engineer. But starting over would have delayed the project and likely would 
have caused the customer to incur additional search costs until a satisfactory 
engineer could be found. 141 So the process did provide the engineer with the 
ability to take advantage of these transaction costs and thereby increase their 
fees. 
B. Other Attempts to Shape Competition 
Markets for professional services have certainly generated a large 
number of examples of agreements to shape the rules under which 
competition takes place, both by suppressing advertising that facilitates 
comparison of competitors and by increasing the difficulty that consumers 
face in obtaining information for themselves. In this section, another such 
example of an attempt to deny information is presented, Indiana Federation 
137 [d. at 692-93 (citations to lower court opinion omitted). This assumes that the 
Society had market power, an issue the Court never fully examined. 
138. /d. at 693-94. 
139. [d. at 693 n.19. 
140. [d. at 682. 
141. Ifthe negotiations broke down and the customer ehose not to use a particular 
engineer, that engineer also would have been harmed since he would have lost the opportunity 
cost oftime spent with that customer. But since the engineers adopted the canon, presumably 
this breakdown in negotiations did not happen too often, or the cost to the engineer was less 
than the gains from partially locking the customers into using their first engineer. Even if the 
customer started over with a new engineer, there would be a risk that the second engineer 
would not offer signifieantIy lower prices. In addition, delay to the project would harm the 
customer but not the engineer, so the costs of a breakdown in negotiations were unequal. 
These possibilities could help the first engineer's negotiation position vis-a-vis her customers. 
2000:941 The Three Types of Collusion 973 
of Dentists, where the consumer's agent-an insurance company-was 
denied diagnostic information. The section then turns to cases in which 
professionals have attempted to prevent competition from certain forms of 
business organizations. 
1. INDIANA FEDERATIONOF DENTISTS 
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists142 
involved a collective decision by an association of dentists to refuse to 
provide x-rays and other material to insurance companies. Dental insurance 
companies required that participating dentists attach a copy of the patient's 
x~rays to reimbursement requests that were submitted to the insurance 
companies. 143 The insurance companies justified this requirement as 
necessary to prevent needless or fraudulent dental work. They submitted these 
x-rays to their own dentists to determine whether the treatment recommended 
by the patient's dentist was warranted. 144 A group of Indiana dentists, 
however, formed an organization called the Indiana Federation of Dentists, 
which decided that member dentists would no longer comply with the 
insurance companies' requests. 145 
The Commission charged that this collective action was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade: 
[A]bsent such a restraint, competition among dentists for patients 
would have tended to lead dentists to compete with respect to their 
policies in dealing with patients' insurers; and that in those areas 
where the Federation's membership was strong, the Federation's 
policy had had the actual effect of eliminating such competition 
among dentists and preventing insurers from obtaining access to x 
rays [sic] in the desired manner. 146 
142. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
143. Id. at 449. 
144. Id. 
145. Another group, the Indiana Dental Association, initially refused to supply the 
requested x-rays. Under a consent agreement with the FTC, however, they abandoned the 
practice. Id. at 449-51. The Indiana Fcderation of Dentists consisted of a small group of 
dentists that refused to accept this Consent Order. This small group was, however, 
concentrated in three specific communities where they appeared to have ~arket power. For 
example, the Federation enlisted nearly 100% of the dental specialists one town. Id. at 451. 
146. Id. at 452. 
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The Federation argued that the agreement was "merely an ethical and 
moral policy designed to enhance the welfare of dental patients,,147 and that 
the provision of x-rays might lead the insurers to make inaccurate care 
determinations. 148 It also argued that insurance companies were free to visit 
dentists' offices and examine the records there: 49 The Court of Appeals 
vacated the Commission's Order,150 but the Supreme Court found that the 
agreement forced insurance companies "to choose between acquiring that 
information in a more costly manner or forgoing it altogether. To this extent, 
at least, competition among dentists with respect to cooperation with the 
requests of insurers was restrained.,,151 The Court rejected the Federation's 
defenses and held that the agreement violated section I of the Sherman 
Act. 152 
This case is similar to others, such as National Society of Professional 
Engineers, where the collusion raised consumer's search costs. Here, 
however, the effect of raising the cost of information was to increase the 
quantity of dental services demanded. As in our other examples, there is no 
suggestion that the dentists charged agreed-upon prices. The combined 
refusal to provide x-rays meant that the dentists' competition was softened or 
altered, not that all competition among them was suppressed, placing this 
case firmly in our category of Type ill cartels. 153 
Note that the Indiana Federation of Dentists agreed to restrictions for the 
purpose of affecting competition among themselves, as opposed to intending 
to control competition from outsiders. This distinction is the distinguishing 
factor that differentiates Type ill collusion from Type II collusion. In a 
number of other cases, actions that affect the parties to an agreement 
implementing those actions also affect entry or expansion of firms outside of 
the agreement, as we shall see in the cases that follow, as well as those 
discussed in Part ill below. 
147. Id. at 453. 
148. Id. at 452. 
149. Id. at 456. 
150. Id. at 453. 
151. Id. at 457. 
152. Id. at 465-66. 
153. A second effect of the agreement in Indiana F'ederation of Dentists was to 
increase the ability of dentists to price discriminate. An insured patient is likely to be willing 
to pay more for enhanced dental services than an uninsured patient is. In a fee-for-service 
setting, price discrimination by dentists would lead to the insured paying more for dental care, 
in part through the provision of additional services that the patient would chose not to 
purchase but for the insurance. 
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2. AFFILIA nON CASES 
Providers of professional services can do so independently or under the 
aegis of a branded retailer or other corporate entity. That is, a service provider 
may be affiliated with or employed by a company that delivers the service in 
conjunction with complementary goods or services. Such combinations have 
not always been welcomed by service providers, who have on occasion have 
attempted to keep service provision independent. 
Agreements to restrict affiliation are common for optometrists. In 
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometryl54 ("Mass. Board"), the 
FTC challenged restrictions banning truthful advertising by optometrists and 
the advertising of affiliations between optometrists and optical retailers. 
These restrictions prevented optometrists from permitting optical 
establishments to advertise truthfully optometrists' "names or the availability 
of their services" (i.e., that the optician has available, or is affiliated with, an 
optometrist).155 Optometrists were also prevented from advertising that they 
offered discounts from their normal fees. 156 
The Commission found evidence that these restrictions had deprived 
consumers of valuable pricing information and made. it significantly more 
difficult for consumers to find out when optometrists were located adjacent 
to opticians or to engage in "one-stop shopping" if they so desired. The 
restrictions appear to have resulted in significantly higher prices for 
optometric services. 157 For these reasons the restrictions are another good 
example of Type ill collusion.lss 
154. Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 1\0 F.T.C. 549 (1988). See also 
Kwoka, supra, note 57; Bond et aI., supra, note 57. 
155. [d. at 551. 
156. [d. 
157. [d. at 552. The Commission found, for example, that optometrists affiliated with 
one national chain charged approximately twice as much in states where affiliation advertising 
was permitted. [d. at 563. The Commission also found that "some consumers have delayed 
or forgone needed optometric services, and some customers have bought optometric services 
that are less desirable to them than the services they would have purchased in the absence of 
the ... conspiracy." [d. at 552-53. 
158. Restrictions on corporate practices were virtually the entire focus of an earlier 
FTC action against an optometric association. In Michigan Optometric, the FTC ordered that 
the Association stop "[p]rohibiting, restricting, or restraining any optometrist from entering 
into or affiliating with a corporate praetice, through any means." Michigan Optometric 
Association; Proposed Consent Agreement With Analysis To Aid Public Comment, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 31387, 31388 (Aug. 2, 1985). While the FTC Order did contain a prohibition against 
"[r]estricting, regulating, prohibiting, impending, declaring unethical, interfering with, or 
adviSing against the advertising, publication, or dissemination of information about 
optometric services," the focus of the opinion was clearly on attempts to preserve the 
independence of optometrists. [d. The record of this case is too sparse to determine exactly 
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3. AGREEMENTS NOT TO SOLICIT CUSTOMERS OF RIVALS 
Agreements to restrict advertising inhibit firms from apprising rivals' 
customers of their offerings. On some occasions, customers are more readily 
contacted directly. Not surprisingly, these sorts of contacts have also been the 
target of restrictive agreements. We mention several such restrictions in 
passing, noting that if perfected they would resemble market division and 
would thus fall into our Type I category. However, in many such cases, firms 
compete for customers in advance of the customer's initial choice of a 
supplier. Price fixing is not suspected at the initial stage. Since these cases 
often treat approaches to the customers as a violation of an ethical code, it is 
not surprising to find these sorts of restrictions linked to advertising bans. 
One such example is provided by the Community Associations Institute, 
a national trade association that included condominium managers and 
condominium owners. The Institute promulgated and employed a code of 
ethics to prevent members from soliciting other members' clients. 159 The 
FTC alleged that this provision unlawfully restrained competition between 
Association members and that it injured consumers, and issued a Consent 
Order prohibiting the Institute from interfering with the truthful solicitation 
or advertising efforts of its members. 160 The Order prevented the Institute 
from interfering with a wide range of solicitation practices, including 
mailings to prospective clients, phone calls designed to attract clients, and the 
offering of free services as marketing promotions. 161 Although these 
restrictions may have made it more difficult for new practitioners to enter the 
field, they appear to be directed primarily inward, to lessen competition 
how the optometrists expected to profit from the restriction. It is possible that they wished to 
prevent non-optometrist assistants or opticians employed by the corporate practices from 
providing services that unaffiliated optometrists typically provided directly, thereby 
preventing substitution for the services of optometrists. 
159. Community Ass'ns Institute, 117 F.T.C. 787, 788 (I994). The Code of Ethics 
contained a "professional courtesy" provision which stated that members could not interfere 
with the contractual relationships between condominium managers and their clients, and that 
members must give notice to other members when they have any significant contact with that 
member's clients. The defendant implemented this provision by declaring unethical "(1) .. 
. solicitations designed to attract an association away from its current manager; (2) quotations 
for management services given to a prospective clicnt before being selected to bid; (3) and 
offering free, non-management services, such as insurance and landscaping, as marketing 
incentives." [d. at 788-89. The Code also prohibited "telephone or personal solicitation 
designed to attract current clients of another manager." [d. 
160. [d. at 789, 791. 
161. [d. at 791. 
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among those agreeing to the restrictions. 162 
C. Agreements Affecting Price Discrimination and Discounting 
Customers often differ in the value they place upon a product, and differ 
as well in their ability or willingness to shop for or become adequately 
informed about particular products. Faced with such customer differences, 
sellers will want to charge more to those who are willing to pay the most, 
either due to high valuation or to limited information about selling terms 
available from rival suppliers. The result is price discrimination. 163 
We can therefore expect price discrimination to be endemic in markets 
with imperfectly informed customers, at least when firms selling in these 
markets are able to infer or to anticipate differences among such customers. 164 
But price discrimination, particularly in markets inhabited by several 
competitors, is difficult to accomplish successfully. A firm wishing to sell 
162. Similar restrictions have been employed by certified public accountants and 
lawyers. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, 113 F.T.C. 698 (1990) 
(accountants); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (holding Florida law restricting 
solicitation of clients by accountants is unacceptable limitation on free speech) (lawyers). But 
see Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., SIS U.S. 618, 635 (1995). 
163. The examples in this section are all of third-degree price discrimination. Such 
discrimination occurs when firms set constant prices per unit for each class of customer. 
Consumers then choose the number of units to purchase. This differs from second-degree 
discrimination, where a firm offers a eommon pricing schedule to all consumers, who then 
sort themselves according to their choice of a price-output bundle from that schedule. For 
third-degree discrimination-apparently the most common form of discrimination-
consumers who value the product highly pay the highest price. In contrast, second-degree 
discrimination typically results in a lower price per unit for customers with strong preferences 
for the product. 
The welfare effects of these types of discrimination are also quite different from one 
another. Under third-degree discrimination, the high-demand customers pay high prices, 
resulting in substantial welfare losses, while the low-demand customers pay prices closer to 
marginal cost. In contrast, the bulk ofthe welfare loss in second-degree price discrimination 
results from the need to make bundles of goods offered to low-demand customers suffiCiently 
unattractive so that high-demand customers do not pose as their low-demand counterparts. 
Note, however, that the surplus generated by the purchases of high-demand customers ends 
up in the pockets of suppliers, so that from the standpoint of consumer welfare, both low- and 
high-demand customers are poorly served by such discrimination. 
When customers are presented with personalized offers, often in the form of take-it-or-
leave it deals negotiated individually (as in the automobile market), the pricing may 
approximate first-degree price discrimination. Such discrimination results in economic 
efficiency, but transfers all surplus to suppliers. For a discussion of the economics of price 
discrimination, see Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 598 (Richard Schmal en see & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
164. For an analysis, see Thomas J. Holmes, The Effects of Third-Degree Price 
Discrimination in Oligopoly, 79 AM. EeoN. REv. 244 (1989). 
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essentially the same product at different prices to various classes of customers 
must possess a degree of market power,165 must be able to sort its customers 
(or to induce them to sort themselves) according to their willingness to pay 
for the product in question, and must stifle the arbitrage opportunities that 
differing prices present. A firm can attempt to implement price discrimination 
unilaterally, without coordinating its actions with those of rivals. In some 
instances, however, an agreement among rivals can either facilitate or 
suppress discrimination. We consider such agreements in this section. 
We begin with a classic example of price discrimination. Prescription 
drugs are sold through retail pharmacies and through large health care 
providers including health maintenance organizations (HMOs), hospitals, 
other managed care providers, and mail-order pharmacies. 166 The retail 
pharmacies are sharply limited in determining which drugs to sell-they 
merely dispense the drugs that physicians prescribe.167 In contrast, the HMOs 
and hospitals issue formularies, lists of recommended drugs, thereby affecting 
a physician's choice of drug. The formularies can be adjusted to include 
drugs for a therapeutic category based upon cost as well as effectiveness. The 
willingness of hospitals and HMOs to consider substitution of one 
pharmaceutical for another means that the elasticity of demand facing the 
maker of a particular drug is much higher for sales to these organizations 
compared to the elasticity of demand by retail pharmacies. The consequence 
of this difference in elasticity is that drug manufacturers will wish to sell at 
higher prices to the retail pharmacies. The prices for the two classes of 
customers will be similar only for drugs for which the HMOs and hospitals 
are unable to find suitable substitutes. 168 
The manufacturers of well-known prescription drugs have two of the 
three prerequisites for price discrimination. First, they possess market power 
based either upon patent protection or on their trademarks. Second, they can 
readily identify which of their consumers has the least elastic demand for 
their products. In order to be able to price discriminate, they need only to 
165. Judge Richard Posner puts this particularly clearly: 
Price discrimination implies market power, that is, the power to charge a price 
above cost (including in 'cost' a profit equal to the cost of equity capital) without 
losing so much business so fast to competitors that the price is unsustainable. The 
reason price discrimination implies market power is that assuming the lower of 
the discriminatory prices covers cost, the higher must exceed cost. 
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). 
166. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
~ 72,446, at 84,120 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1999). 
167. The pharmacies have "no clout" with physicians. In re Brand Name 
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d at 788. 
168. This is the case with the anticoagulant Coumaden. See In re Brand Name 
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599,615 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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ensure that the drugs sold at comparatively low prices to HMOs and hospitals 
do not make their way to the retail pharmacies from which the drug 
manufacturers demand higher prices. 
The drug manufacturers will adopt the resulting discrimination 
unilaterally-there is no need for an agreement among themselves. Indeed, 
an agreement that sets prices would be very difficult to formulate and to 
enforce, given the differences among the products offered for sale. 
Nevertheless, there may have been a role for an agreement to facilitate 
discrimination. This is due to the fact that prescription drugs are typically not 
sold directly to the firms that ultimately dispense them to patients. Instead, 
manufacturers sell to an intermediate stage, drug wholesalers. The 
wholesalers could easily frustrate price discrimination by diverting low-price 
drugs intended for large health care providers to retail pharmacies. If this 
arbitrage occurred, the manufacturers could respond by selling drugs directly 
to the downstream customers, bypassing the wholesalers for low price drugs 
while retaining them for shipments to retail pharmacies. If the wholesalers 
were efficient drug distributors, this bypass would be inefficient. Wholesalers 
and manufacturers would each have an incentive to "fix" the wholesale 
distribution system to prevent arbitrage, avoiding wasteful duplication of the 
wholesaling function. 
Such a system has indeed been designed. Wholesalers have 
implemented (and may have agreed to implement)169 a "chargeback" system 
under which wholesalers would pay a common wholesale price sufficient to 
yield the manufacturer's desired price to retail pharmacies (including the 
wholesaler's margin). Lower prices to HMOs and the like were supported by 
rebates to the wholesalers paid by manufacturers when presented with 
evidence demonstrating that the drugs were sold to favored customers. 170 The 
wholesaler's interest in implementing the system was not so much to serve 
the manufacturers' interest as to avoid the loss of a substantial portion of the 
wholesaling business to direct distribution. 
Assume for a moment that the wholesalers, but not the manufacturers, 
had, in fact, agreed to deny discounts to retail pharmacies by adopting the 
chargeback system. 171 This agreement would fit into the category of Type ill 
169. "[T]he plaintiffs have presented evidence that the defendant manufacturers 
agreed among themselves, and also with the defendant wholesalers, to refuse discounts to 
pharmacies and to make the refusal stick by adopting the charge back system in order to 
prevent arbitrage." !d. at 604. 
170. This system is deseribed in some detail in Judge Posner's opinion. Jd. at 603. 
171. It is by no means clear why the wholesalers would not have adopted such a 
system unilaterally, as a competitive device to attract manufacturer business. Any wholesaler 
who could commit credibly not to engage in arbitrage would thereby gain a competitive 
advantage over rival wholesalers. 
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agreements since it significantly affected non-cooperative market outcomes. 
But would it be illegal? In the view of Judge Posner, the answer is no. l72 But 
what if the manufacturers themselves had agreed to use the chargeback 
system to deny discounts to retail pharmacies? Why might such an agreement 
have been entered into? Judge Posner reasons as follows: 
One might have supposed that if the defendants were going to 
collude on price, they would go the whole hog and agree not to 
provide discounts to the hospitals and other customers favored by 
the discriminatory system. But the defendants' cartel-if that is 
what it is-may not be tight enough to prevent hospitals and other 
bulk purchasers with power to shift demand among different 
manufacturers' drugs from whipsawing the members of the cartel 
for discounts; or maybe these purchasers could shift demand to 
manufacturers that are not members of the cartel. If, for whatever 
reason, the elasticity of demand for a cartel's product differs among 
groups of purchasers, a single cartel price will not be profit-
maximizing unless a discriminatory price scheme cannot be 
enforced at reasonable cost. 173 
The problem with this analysis is that it confuses two of the classes of 
172. He explains: 
[T]he system would be a per se violation of the Sherman Act ... only ifit were 
either a device for eliminating eompetition among wholesalers, which is not 
charged, or an instrument of a conspiracy among the manufacturers to eliminate 
or reduce competition among themselves. If, instead, each manufacturer was 
engaged in lawful, noncollusive price discrimination, it would no more be illegal 
per se for the wholesalers to devise collectively a system by which each 
manufacturer could engage in discriminatory pricing while selling through 
wholesalers than it would be illegal per se for them to agree on a standard form 
for inventorying drugs or a common method of inspecting drugs to make sure 
they are safe. Competitors are permitted by the antitrust laws (and certainly by 
the per se rule) to engage in cooperative behavior, under trade association 
auspices or otherwise, provided they don't reduce competition among themselves 
or help their suppliers or customers to reduce competition. If the wholesalers in 
this case were merely helping individual manufacturers maximize their profits by 
methods pcrmitted by antitrust law, which includc noncollusive price 
discrimination, thcre was no violation of antitrust law at either the manufacturer 
or the wholesaler level. 
In re Brand Name, 186 F.3d at 784-85 (citations omitted). 
We believe that this statement is too strong. An agreement among firms to harm a rival by 
raising that rival's costs can be condemned even ifit neither reduces competition among the 
parties to the agreement nor helps suppliers or customers to reduce competition. E.g., Fashion 
Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
173. In re Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 604. 
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collusion we have identified. To see this, one needs to examine the economics 
of price discrimination in a bit more detail. We suppose that firms face two 
markets, termed "weak" and "strong,,,174 with the weak market being the one 
in which firms choose to set a lower price. Each firm sets its prices for each 
of the markets to maximize its profit, taking the prices of rivals as given. The 
resulting prices are dependent on the elasticity of demand in each of the 
markets, with the strong market being the one with the lowest demand 
elasticity.175 If the firm is a monopolist, it simply sets a relatively high price 
for customers characterized by low industry or market demand elasticity. 
However, if its customers have rivals to which they can defect in the event of 
a price increase, then its loss of sales is a combination of the sales lost due to 
overall market demand elasticity and those lost to rival firms. 
Firms will always wish to exploit differences in market demand 
elasticity among classes of customers. If a firm is a monopolist, it will choose 
to set higher prices in its less elastic market and will thereby raise profits. 
Accordingly, a mature cartel facing differing classes of customers will set not 
a single price, but a schedule of prices. The last sentence of Judge Posner's 
analysis is applicable to cartels, and is thus appropriate for Type I collusion, 
but the rest of the analysis is less clear. Firms facing two classes of 
customers, one of which will "whipsaw" for discounts, may well be better off 
by carving off that class of customers for separate treatment. The reason is 
that the price from which discounts are made is not constant. If the 
"whipsawing" (weak-market) customers are lumped with the remaining 
purchasers, and all are charged a uniform price, that uniform price is likely 
to be lower than the price charged to the strong market alone. The ability to 
divide customers into classes, only one of which may receive discounts, need 
not always raise profits, but often will, and hence firms may want to facilitate 
such discrimination. 
The facilitation will likely center on attempts to prevent consumers from 
arbitraging price differences. Carving off price-sensitive consumers for 
competition permits higher prices for strong-market customers, but the 
resulting price differentials will tempt customers paying higher prices to try 
to qualify for discounts. Indeed, the formation of "buying groups" of retail 
pharmacies in pursuit of discounts was the proximate cause of the 
wholesalers' adoption of the chargeback system. From the standpoint of 
manufacturers, if it were profitable to separate strong- and weak-market 
customers, it must have been sensible to agree on just which customers 
174. JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION (1933). Our use 
ofthe terminology for markets occupied by more than one firm is ambiguous (for reasons that 
will become apparent), but it is used for purposes of presenting an intuitive discussion. 
175. We follow the convention of interpreting demand elasticity as an absolute value. 
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belonged in each market. A manufacturer that incorrectly offered a discount 
to a strong-market customer would thereby raise the strong-market elasticity 
of demand for each of its rivals, thus lowering prices in the strong market and 
reducing profits for all. Conversely, a potential weak-market customer who 
was not offered discounts would also make the strong-market elasticities of 
demand for each of the manufacturers higher than they should be. Agreement 
to assign customers to one market or the other could be profitable, preventing 
misclassification (from the manufacturers' point of view). But given that the 
collusion entailed would not extend to an agreement over individual prices, 
such collusion, if it occurred, would not be Type I collusion, but would 
instead fall into the Type III category. 
Ultimately, the district court in Brand Name Prescription Drugs found 
that no evidence of agreement had been provided by plaintiffs, effectively 
ending the case. 176 But it is nonetheless important to keep in mind that the 
agreement, had it existed, might have been designed not to facilitate a Type I 
cartel, but rather to shape competition among manufacturers. An agreement 
by wholesalers to install a chargeback system could hardly have served as the 
cat's paw of a Type I manufacturer cartel, but it could have shaped the 
environment in which manufacturers independently set prices and discounts 
to yield higher manufacturer profits, and thus the potential for Type III 
collusion. 
Agreements governing price discrimination can also attempt to limit the 
size of discounts offered. Despite the fact that they have the opposite effect 
of the alleged agreement to facilitate pharmaceutical price discrimination, 
they are also Type III, and not Type I agreements-though they can easily be 
mistaken for the latter. Consider agreements among groceries to halt the 
practice of "double coupons," that is, crediting a customer's grocery bill for 
double the face value of manufacturer coupons. 177 An agreement to halt the 
practice of double coupons is not equivalent price fixing, because the base 
prices to which the coupon discounts are applied are not set collusively.178 
Indeed, under some circumstances, such an agreement could increase 
176. 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 72,446, at 84,162 (N.D. III. Jan. 19, 1999). 
177. Connecticut ex rei. Lieberman v. The Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 1989-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 68,796 (D. Conn. July 19, 1988). 
178. "The court is persuaded that ... a conspiracy to discontinue double coupons is 
a form of price-fixing and therefore is a per se violation of the Sherman Act." Unitcd States 
v. The Stop & Shop Cos., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 66,689, at 63,240 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 
1984). The issue here is whether the rivals setting the coupon policy compete over the base 
prices to which discounts apply. In cases where the base prices are determined exogenously, 
as, for example in real estate sales, firms that agreed to fix commissions as a given percentage 
of a base price have in fact engaged in price fixing. 
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welfare. 179 
Ordinarily however, the suppression of discounts is simply the 
suppression of competitive impulses. Double coupons, for instance, are a way 
for grocers to appeal to customers who have been identified as shoppers by 
their willingness to redeem manufacturer coupons. Many price discrimination 
schemes entail some costs to those who use them, but for double coupons, the 
costs of administering the scheme are borne by the manufacturer. 180 It is also 
unlikely that manufacturers providing coupons could effectively respond to 
an offer of double coupons by adjusting their own wholesale prices to the 
grocers in question. Hence the primary effect of double coupons is not to 
offer discounts for the purchase of particular items, but rather a discount on 
the grocery store's margin for customers who have demonstrated a 
willingness to shop. Discounts to customers based on their willingness to 
h I I . . d 181 S op are c ear y pro-competItIve an pro-consumer. 
United States v. Brown Universityl82 involved another agreement to 
affect the way that competitors engaged in price discrimination. The 
agreement in question was reached by the "Ivy Overlap Group," which 
consisted of eight Ivy League schools plus MIT. Each school had decided on 
its own to engage in price discrimination by discounting tuition to poor 
students through grants of financial aid. The Ivy Overlap Group improved 
upon this unilateral price discrimination in two ways. The Group's members 
agreed on the discounts to be offered to needy studentsl83 and simultaneously 
agreed not to engage in price competition for especially talented prospective 
students. 184 Members shared financial information and attempted to derive a 
standardized methodology to ensure that students did not choose which 
school to attend on the basis of cost (i.e., the net amount that they and their 
family would have to pay).185 The Ivy Overlap Group met to discuss each 
179. For an interesting analysis of the incentive to limit coupons and of the welfare 
effects of such a limitation, see Ralph A. Winter, Colluding on Relative Prices, 28 RAND J. 
ECON. 359 (1997). See also text accompanying note 237 for a discussion of the welfare 
effccts of double coupons. 
180. In contrast to double coupons, discrimination in the fonn oftrading stamps or 
provision of "free" serviees entails costs for the retailer. 
181. Yongmin Chen, Oligopoly Price Discrimination and Resale Price Maintenance, 
30 RANDJ. ECON. 441 (1999). 
182. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
183. [d. at 662. "The purpose of the Overlap agreement is to neutralize the effect of 
financial aid so that a student may choose among Ivy Group institutions for non-financial 
reasons." !d. at 662 n.2. 
184. [d. at 663. Only differences of less than $500 were pennitted. 
185. The organization met each year to agree upon methodological issues that arose. 
For example, they had to agree upon what lcvel of financial contributions they could expect 
from divorced parents, how much the student would be likely to earn from summer 
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student who had been admitted by more than one of the schools to ensure that 
the net cost to that student would be essentially identical no matter which 
member school she decided to attend. 
The district court characterized the agreement as "price fixing" that 
eliminated price competition between the schools. 186 It condemned the 
practices under the "quick look" version of the rule of reason without 
considering any alleged social benefits of the agreement. 187 The court of 
appeals reversed the decision in light of a number of proffered arguments that 
the overall effect of the agreement actually was to enhance consumer 
choice. 188 It remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
perform a full rule of reason analysis. I 89 This analysis was to include a 
balancing of the schools' desire to provide financial aid to a large number of 
the most needy students, with the benefits of allowing the free market to 
bestow merit-based scholarships on the most gifted students who did not 
require financial assistance. 190 The case settled before this balancing could 
be performed. 191 
This case involved a complex agreement that involved both Type I and 
Type III collusion between the schools. Insofar as the Ivy Overlap Group 
agreed upon the net tuition price that the poorer students would pay, the 
schools were engaging in Type I collusion. The schools did compete on the 
basis of price, however, for the wealthier students; their tuition charges for 
non-scholarship students were not identical. Moreover, the Ivy Overlap 
Group agreed not to provide merit-based scholarships for the wealthier 
students. The Ivy Overlap Group thus was engaging in Type III collusion 
concerning these students since an agreement not to offer merit-based 
scholarships was an agreement over an important aspect of potential 
competition between these schools. 
employment, and how much the student was likely to receive in outside scholarships. Id. 
186. Id. at 664. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 675. There wcre additional reasons for the Court's decision. 
189. Id. at 678. The economic analysis of this case is somewhat more difficult than 
that addressed by the courts in this case. Unlike double coupons, the discrimination in college 
tuition based upon need related to differences in valuations by consumers placed upon an Ivy 
League education, though it is likely that consumers would also have shopped among colleges 
based on the price offered. 
190. Id. at 677. This analysis was also to include a determination of whether the 
agreement was reasonably necessary to further its legitimate goals, and was to extend to other 
factors as well. Id. 
191. MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 329 (4th ed. 1997). 
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ill. PRACTICES THAT HAVE SOME ATTRIBUTES 
OF Two COLLUSION CATEGORIES 
985 
Most of our examples thus far have been presented as if our three 
collusion categories are necessarily distinct. We have shown how each type 
of collusion is distinct as to methods, mechanism, and effects, and have 
analyzed a number of cases and classified them as being within one category 
or another. In reality, however, many real world cases are more complicated 
and defy simple categorization. Many complex arrangements, such as the Ivy 
Overlap case just discussed, have characteristics or effects of two collusion 
categories. The Ivy Overlap case, however, is unusual in that respect, as 
many examples of Type I collusion stand alone. If every firm in an industry 
agrees to raise prices, this often is enough to ensure supracompetitive 
pricing. 192 
By contrast, Type IT collusion will often be accompanied by Type I 
collusion. As a Type II cartel raises its rivals' costs, its members often must 
engage in Type I collusion. Otherwise cartel members may compete away the 
potential profits that could be gained by taking advantage of their higher-cost, 
weakened or chastened rivals. 193 Therefore, the two forms of collusion often 
will go together. 
On the other hand, Type III collusion generally will be undertaken under 
those circumstances where Type I collusion would be unlikely to be 
successful,194 or would be likely to be detected. 195 In many respects, Type III 
collusion can be thought of as an imperfect substitute for Type I collusion, as 
a way of making an industry better for cartel members, but not imitating a 
monopoly as perfectly as classic collusion. Type I collusion transforms an 
industry into a monopoly; Type ill collusion merely reshapes rivalry so that 
members are insulated to some degree from competition. Type ill collusion, 
like Type I, is inwardly directed, but it involves no direct agreement over 
fmal product prices, output, or market division.196 Of course, firms may agree 
192. This assumes the existence of barriers to entry, etc. See supra note 17. To the 
extent that higher prices beget entry, Type I collusion can be impaired. A possible response 
by the cartel is to hinder or handicap this new entry through Type 11 or Type 111 eollusion. 
193. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
194. Classic colIusion might be too difficult to implement where, for example, 
products or prices are heterogeneous, transactions are too difficult for the cartel to monitor, 
or it would be too difficult for the cartel to punish cartel members who deviate from the 
agreement. 
195. While it certainly would be possible for a cartel to employ Type 111 collusion 
to supplement Type I collusion, this often would be redundant and unduly risky. 
196. Territorial or customer allocation schemes also involve no direct agreement over 
prices. Firms can set prices independently within their exclusive section of the market. 
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upon practices that facilitate Type I collusion or make Type I cartels more 
stable, and these facilitating practices are, in some respects, changes in the 
rules of competition in the industry. However, since their ultimate goal is to 
assist the formation or functioning of a price fixing agreement, these cases 
should be considered forms of Type I cartels. 197 
Many examples of Type ill collusion do have accompanying Type II 
effects. Type ill advertising restriction cases, for example, also can have the 
effect of disadvantaging some rivals or potential rivals. Often these cases will 
involve. some classes of rivals who would not independently give up their 
ability to advertise. More generally, it is likely that many or most changes in 
major competitive rules under which an industry operates will have disparate 
impacts on different classes of firms within the industry. Since Type III 
cartels are primarily directed inwards, this is unsurprising. 
As an illustration, consider an important case that was analyzed above. 
The straightforward effect of the advertising restrictions in Mass. Board was 
to manipulate the rules of competition in a manner that made comparative 
shopping more difficult for consumers. These increased consumer search 
costs led to higher prices. 198 In addition, the advertising restrictions also seem 
to have had the effect of impeding firms that wanted to enter the market and 
hampering firms within the market that want to expand aggressively. We do 
not know whether the restrictions at issue in Mass. Board actually caused the 
promotion costs of new or prospective opticians to increase. 199 Although we 
lack the necessary data, we would not be at all surprised if the restrictions did 
cause the revenues of some types of firms within the industry to decrease.2oo 
Nevertheless, this case is a good example of practices that have both Type II 
and ill effects. 
Contrast this with polar examples of relatively "pure" Type 111 and 
197. Our Type III collusion over rules is different from non-cooperative adoption of 
practices felt likely to facilitate cartel formation or stability. Compare the FTC's unsuccessful 
action against manufacturers of tetraethyl lead in E. /. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (setting aside Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), with the double 
coupon example. In Ethyl, the firms in question were not alleged to have agreed over either 
prices or rules. In the double coupon cases, the grocery stores did agree to set rules for 
competition, but they did not agree on any prices. 
198. Mass. Bd., I to F.T.C. at 552. 
199. Indeed, a ban on advertising could actually cause the opticians to save money. 
200 In Mass. Board, discount chain stores with a proclivity towards aggressive 
advertising campaigns seem to have been particularly hurt by the restrictions. Id. Relative to 
these firms, the more traditional opticians benefited. The cartel might well have adopted the 
restrictions initially primarily to change the rules of competition within the industry. Only 
later did the advertising restrictions playa significant role in slowing down the spread of the 
relatively new discount chain operations. See also Kwoka, supra, note 57; Bond et aI., supra, 
note 57. 
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Type II cartels. The San Jose newspaper boycott, for example, clearly 
manipulated the rules of competition in that industry.20I It would be difficult, 
however, to find significant ways in which this boycott was similar to, or had 
the effects of, either Type I or Type II collusion. There is no reason to believe 
the boycott was part of a cartel plan to engage in classic collusion over prices 
or related terms. Nor is it likely that any actual or prospective rival dealers 
had their costs raised, or their revenues reduced, by the practices. Rather, the 
overwhelming effect of the boycott was to manipulate the rules of 
competition in a manner that helped the entire industry vis-a-vis consumers. 
Among the relatively pure Type ill cases discussed above are Dillon,202 
Fastline,203 and Indiana Federation of Dentists.204 
By contrast, consider a well known Type II collusion case. Allied Tube 
& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. involved an agreement by a group of 
producers of steel conduit for electrical wiring used in the walls and floors of 
buildings.205 Rival firms had begun to manufacture conduit made from 
plastic, which had a number of cost and other advantages over the steel 
variety. Defendants, members of the National Fire Protection Association, an 
organization that promulgated the National Electric Code, agreed to vote to 
exclude plastic conduit from the forthcoming version of the Code.206 If 
plastic conduit were not certified through a listing in the Code, its sales would 
decline dramatically. The effect of the agreement therefore was to reduce the 
revenues of plastic conduit manufacturers significantly-a Type II effect. 
The steel manufacturers' agreement was not, however, a Type III agreement 
since it was outward in nature, and directed against a group of rivals. It 
involved no inwardly directed manipulation of the ways in which 
manufacturers of steel conduit competed against one another, nor was it a 
Type I cartel. There was no indication that, at any time, the manufacturers of 
steel conduit conspired to fix prices either directly or indirectly.207 
Types II and ill collusion do, however, have one similarity. Some Type 
ill collusion is directed towards entities outside of the cartel, and can 
disadvantage them by raising their costs or reducing their revenue. For 
example, the direct target of the collusion in Santa Clara Motor Vehicle 
201. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
202. See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
203. See supra Part II.A.I.c. 
204. See supra Part I1.B. I. 
205. 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
206. Id. at 495-96. Defendants offered a number of defenses, including that they had 
valid scientific bases for their actions and that they were just petitioning governmental units. 
Id. at 498-511. 
207. See generally, id. 
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Dealers was a newspaper/os in Fastline a circular/o9 in ES Development a 
planned auto mall/1o in Dillon a television station211 and in Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, insurance companies.212 But the harm to the third 
parties was incidental-they were harmed only to facilitate or further the 
manipulation of the rules of competition. It was simply a necessary, 
intermediary part of an overall plan to change the rules of competition. 213 By 
contrast,the primary victims of Type IT collusion are all members of, or 
potential entrants into, an industry.214 
Many cartels-like cases of ordinary price fixing, or the San Jose 
newspaper boycott case-are relatively pure, and can fairly be classified as 
being solely within a single collusion category. But others have mixed 
attributes, primary and secondary effects, or a balance of effects from two 
categories that change over time215 or depend upon which activities or parties 
predominate.216 In these cases our classification should not be thought of as 
three completely separate boxes into which all cartels can be classified. 
Rather, it should be viewed as a way to identify and highlight three attributes 
or intermediary goals of collusion, one or more of which will be present in 
every case that is anticompetitive. 
208. Supra Part II.A.2.c. 
209. Supra Part II.A. I.c. 
2 I O. Supra Part II.A.2.d. 
21 I. Supra Part II.A.2.b. 
2 I 2. Supra Part II.B. I. 
213. In some of these cases the collusion would change the rules of competition in 
a manner that benefited the cartel. Other times it would preserve the old ways against a 
change to a more competitive equilibrium. 
214. Of course, a firm which believed that it would be disadvantaged by Type III 
collusion often could, at least to some extent, refuse to go along with or protect itself from 
some of the cartel's cffects. For example. not every dentist in Indiana believed that their 
individual interests would be served through participation in the boycott, and not every 
dentists chose to participate in the cartel. Supra Part II.B.1. Dentists who believed they 
would be better off if they agree to provide x-rays could do so subject, of course, to whatever 
pressures the Fedcration could employ to cncourage their participation. For example. a 
general practitioner might be able to resist more than a specialist who relied upon cartel 
members for referrals. 
These protective actions constitute another reason why the main effect of the practices 
in question was outward oriented towards consumers through their surrogates, the insurance 
companies. Effects on rival dentists were secondary. 
215. Supra Part 11.8.2. 
2 I 6. In ES Development, for examplc, any car dealer invited to join the nascent auto 
mall in who engaged in the boycott would be engaged in Type III collusion, while a dealer 
who was never invited to join would be engaged in Type II collusion. 
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IV. WELFARE EFFECTS OF TYPE III COLLUSION 
The welfare effects of Type III collusion are more difficult to 
characterize than those of Type II or, particularly, Type I, collusion. One 
problem is that agreements for purposes other than monopoly can often be 
desirable. Accordingly, competitors are permitted to devise rules for their 
industries, in the form of standards or otherwise, as long as the rules do not 
significantly reduce competition among them. In some cases rules have been 
held to be lawful even when an avenue of competition is ruled out, because 
the benefits of the rule are held to more than counterbalance any 
anticompetitive effects. Some of the practices addressed in the Supreme 
Court's CDA decision217 fall into this category. So too does a decision to 
permit firms to agree not to engage in a form of bidding behavior which could 
have been pro-competitive in effect, but which carried with it an incentive for 
bidders to distort the products they provided. 
The case in question is Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers. 218 
Vogel, an experienced gem appraiser, charged a flat rate of one percent. 219 
Although he had been a member of the American Society of Appraisers, the 
group expelled him out of the belief "'that it [was] unprofessional and 
unethical for the appraiser to do work for a fixed percentage of the amount 
of value ... which he determine[ d] at the conclusion of his work. ",220 Vogel 
sued, alleging price fixing.221 
Judge Posner observed, "[i]n general, the only types of horizontal price 
agreements that the antitrust laws have been held to forbid are those that have 
the purpose or likely effect of raising price above the competitive level.,,222 
Judge Posner observed that Vogel's system of charging a one percent 
appraisal fee was not a charge related to the time, skill, or effort needed to 
perform the appraisal. Rather, it was a way to charge more to wealthier or less 
sophisticated customers. He called Vogel's fees a form of "price 
discrimination, which is normally anticompetitive.,,223 
Judge Posner also noted that the Society's prohibition against percentage 
appraisal fees seemed to have been based upon legitimate ethical concems.224 
217. See supra Part I1.A. Lb. 
218. 744 F.2d 598 (7th CiT. 1984). 
219. Id. at 599. Vogel's rate was subject to a ten dollar minimum. 
220. Id. (quoting the American Society of Appraisers bylaws). 
221. Id. at 600. He also alleged a boycott, but Judge Posner did not find it necessary 
to consider this allegation separately. 
222. Id. at 60 I. He then noted two exceptions to the rule that limited per se illegality 
to practices that raised prices: buyer cartels and maximum price fixing. Id. at 601-02. 
223. Id. at 602. 
224. Id. at 603. 
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The method gave'me appraiser an incentive to value the gem at an unduly 
high price. Some customers, such as those who wanted to sell their gems, also 
had an incentive to want the appraised price to be higher than their gem was 
worth, so they also might have wanted an inaccurate appraisal. 
Judge Posner added that he doubted that the members of the Association 
were altruists. Rather, he presumed that they banned the practice of appraisals 
based upon a percent of value out of a fear that it would bring the appraisal 
business into disrepute and thus lower their profits in the long run.22S He 
concluded that the "challenged bylaw is more likely a praiseworthy effort at 
self-regulation than a device for facilitating supracompetitive pricing.,,226 
The court rejected Vogel's challenge to the Society's bylaw. Clearly the 
bylaw affected competition among appraisers, but Judge Posner's decision 
appears to have been correct.227 This case illustrates that decisions regarding 
Type ill collusion will be difficult, but in many cases, the anticompetitive 
consequences of the agreements, particularly those increasing consumer 
search costs, will be clear. We analyze such cases below. 
A. Welfare in One-Price Markets 
When a market functions competitively, it will maximize the welfare of 
society as a whole.228 Both consumers and producers benefit.229 In a well-
functioning market, consumers will search out those products most suitable 
for their needs. They also search for the best prices, utilizing whatever 
information they have or can acquire cost-effectively. 
Different consumers often value products differently, yet in most 
markets every consumer pays the same amount. Except for the most marginal 
of consumers, whenever a consumer purchases in a competitive market, she 
receives as a benefit "consumers' surplus"-the difference between that 
amount that a product is worth to her (her "willingness to pay") and the price 
she actually pays for it. In graphical terms, the consumer surplus associated 
with a particular unit is given by the difference between the height of the 
demand curve for that unit and the price a consumer pays for the unit. For 
example, in Figure 1, if the price charged in the market illustrated is pm, then 
qm units will be purchased. The last unit purchased has a value to its 
consumer equal to pm; no consumer surplus is generated by its consumption. 
225. Id. at 602. 
226. Id. 
227. Note, however, that the anticompetitive prospect that concerned Judge Posner 
was that the rule might affect the success of a cartel among appraisers, not that ruling out one 
form of competition might simply soften price competition among appraisers. 
228. TIROLE, supra note 18, at 6. We ignore complications sueh as externalities. 
229. Id. 
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However, for each of the remaining units between 0 andpm, willingness to 
pay exceeds the price paid, generating a total consumer surplus of area ABpm. 
If sellers could somehow separate consumers from one another and read their 
minds, they would be able to price discriminate and acquire this wealth-the 
price charged for each unit will equal the height of the demand curve for that 
unit, and area ABpm would be captured by the seller.230 Even most real world 
monopolies, however, must pick a single supracompetitive price, such as pm 
in Figure 1. This enables a monopolist to acquire some, but not all, of the 
consumer surplus. 
o 
Monopoly Wealth Transfer and/or 
Rent-seeking Resource Use 
Allocative Efficiency Loss 
Due to Monopoly 
Fignre 1: Consnmer Snrplus and Deadweight Loss 
When collusion is effective it can diminish welfare in significant ways. 
Moreover, each of the three categories of collusion leads to different types of 
deleterious effects on welfare. In particular, Type ill collusion leads to 
welfare problems that are even more complex and numerous then those 
caused by Type I or Type II collusion. 
Type I collusion leads to a well-known set of welfare effects. Since a 
Type I cartel directly raises prices, it causes a loss of societal wealth termed 
allocative inefficiency.231 These higher prices also cause wealth to be 
230. The monopolist could also capture the area BDE, since the units between qm and 
qc could be sold without affecting the amount the monopolist could charge for the first qm 
units. 
231. [d. at 67. In Figure I, a monopoly price of Pm is above marginal cost, c. This 
results in output of qm, below the optimal output, q". The resulting loss of allocative 
efficiency is given by the area BDE. 
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transferred from consumers to the cartel,232 to be dissipated in the fonn of 
rent-seeking behavior,233 or both. From society's perspective, costs to the 
cartel of holding itself together or of disciplining cheaters also are welfare 
reducing.234 
Since Type II cartels lead to supracompetitive pricing, they can also 
cause each of the detrimental effects on consumer welfare that are caused by 
Type I collusion. In addition, collusion to disadvantage rivals also requires 
the wasteful expenditure of resources to accomplish the cartel's objectives.235 
Type II collusion can lead to defensive measures by the victims of the cartel 
that are, from society's perspective, wasteful, and needed to be added to the 
added cost burden the rivals incur.236 
The welfare effects of Type III cartels are even more numerous and 
complex. Since prices to consumers are higher than they would have been 
in the absence of the cartel, Type III cartels lead to every type of welfare loss 
associated with Type I cartels.237 Additionally, some Type III cartels, like 
Type II cartels, involve attacks on other fmns.238 The costs of implementing 
these attacks, and the defensive maneuvers they spawn, constitute a waste of 
societal resources just as they do when they are generated by Type II cartels. 
In addition, most Type III cartels increase consumer search costS.239 
These increased costs are not captured by the cartel. From the cartel's 
232. Whether this transfer is undesirable or is a concern of the antitrust laws is 
controversial. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982). 
233. Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. 
ECON. 807 (1975); see also TIROLE, supra note 18, at 76. In Figure I, area PmBDc is the 
additional cost to consumers of monopoly pricing at Pm compared to the marginal cost pricing 
at c that would characterize a perfectly competitive market. An aspiring monopolist will be 
willing to pay up to this amount to secure its monopoly. If it uses real resources in the 
process, for example in paying for advertising campaigns in support of politicians that favor 
its position, the resources used represent social welfare loss. The area is, instead, a transfer 
from one poeket to another if the monopolist simply gets to keep its rents or ifit transfers its 
rents directly to the pockets of politicians in order to secure the monopoly. 
234. These costs are included in the area pmBDc in Figure I. 
235. As for Type I cartels, some of the consumer surplus would in this way be 
dissipated instead of acquired by the cartel. 
236. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 32, at 247, 279-81; Krattenmaker, et aI., 
supra note 28, at 244-45, 249, 266-69. 
237. This includes the losses potentially associated with disciplining cartel members. 
238. However, the targets of Type II cartels are within or potentially within the 
industry, while the targets of Type III cartels are outside the industry. For example, the target 
of the cartel in the Santa Clara County Motor Vehicle Dealers case was the San Jose Mercury 
News newspaper that published information that permitted consumers to shop more 
effectively. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
239. See, e.g., the discussions of Nat 'I Society of Professional Engineers, supra Part 
II.A.2.e; ES Dev., supra Part II.A.2.d; Dillon, supra Part II.A.2.b. 
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perspective they are undesirable since expenditures by consumers in the fonn 
of artificially increased search costs constitute revenue that cannot be 
captured as profit by the cartel. Indeed, the cartel would prefer to make search 
so expensive as to render it economically impracticable, thereby presenting 
finns with monopoly power through consumer isolation. From society's 
perspective, while the costs of infonnation are simply a cost of making 
markets function, artificially increased consumer search costs, like the costs 
expended by the cartel to cause them, are a waste of resources. 
Many Type ill cartels also decrease consumer welfare by lowering the 
quality or variety of products consumers would have received if the market 
had been operating nonnally. Consider, for example, Detroit Auto Dealers 
Ass 'n?40 Not only did the hour restrictions lead to higher automobile prices; 
because their shopping time was sub-optimal, consumers may have been 
forced to settle for a car less precisely suited to their needs.241 This holds true 
for other cases-consumers might have been subjected to unnecessary or 
fraudulent dental work,242 or might have had to settle for a lawyer,243 
engineer/44 or condominium manager45 that was sub-optimal for their 
purposes. A Type ill cartel might have prevented consumers from fmding out 
that there was an optical producf46 or agricultural vehic1e247 that would 
benefit them. From the consumers' perspective, the quality of their purchases 
decreased. 
B. Welfare Losses with Price Discrimination 
Many of our examples of Type ill collusion involve consumers of 
varying types who pay prices that vary according to customer type. The 
efficiency effects of price discrimination are typically ambiguous so that, 
240. Supra Part II.A.2.a. 
24 I. Potential purchasers commonly test drive a number of cars before they can 
determine which one best suits their particular needs. If consumers must shop at times they 
find undesirable, such added costs need to be counted as social welfare loss. In addition, we 
need to include any losses due to "settling" for a suboptimal selection, as discussed in 
conjunction with Fastline, supra Part ILA.I.c. For instance, if a consumer pays $20,000 for 
a green car, but would have been willing to pay $22,000 for an otherwise identical car at 
another dealer that the consumer would have shopped if not for the agreement to restrict 
dealer hours, social welfare costs need to include the foregone $2,000 in consumer surplus 
net of additional search costs incurred. 
242. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
243. See supra Part II.A. La. (discussing Bates). 
244. See supra Part ILA.2.e. 
245. See supra Part ILB.3. 
246. See supra Part 11.B.2. (discussing Mass. Bd.). 
247. See supra Part II.A.1.c. (discussing Fastline). 
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unlike simple cartel price fixing, a case-by-case analysis is likely to be 
appropriate before agreements either to facilitate or to impair discrimination 
can be evaluated. Such analyses must confront two major sources of 
ambiguity, one tied to efficiency and the other to distribution. First, price 
discrimination may often lead to increased sales-the customers who are 
offered discounts are those most likely to respond to low prices by increasing 
their quantities demanded, while their counterparts facing higher prices are 
not as sensitive, and hence less willing to cut back. Output increases are 
desirable, since for such products price exceeds marginal cost, and therefore 
society benefits from increased production. Here, there are two forces 
operating in opposite directions. First, the allocation of existing output is 
made worse, because more consumption is done by customers who place a 
relatively low valuation on the additional units, while high marginal valuation 
customers (possibly) consume less. Second, output may not increase at all, 
because shaving off customers who search intensively may allow for much 
higher prices for those who do not, so that even though customers who 
receive discounts are more responsive to price changes than those who pay 
higher base prices, the latter must respond to much larger price increases than 
the price declines for the more elastic customers.248 
The second problem with assessing welfare effects of price 
discrimination is determining the standard under which such effects are 
evaluated. The effects on overall economic welfare may in many cases be 
quite small in comparison to the very large income transfers from consumers 
to producers that price discrimination can facilitate.249 These problems can 
be illustrated if we employ a number of simplifying assumptions. Assume that 
the suppliers whose behavior we wish to analyze are retailers who purchase 
from an upstream manufacturer for resale to consumers. All suppliers are 
assumed to pay a common wholesale price and to incur identical and constant 
per unit distribution costs, the sum of which is denoted by c.2SO Consumers 
are also assumed to have identical demands for the product in question, but 
are assumed to differ in the amount of information about competing suppliers 
that they have chosen to obtain. Figure 2 depicts the market demand curve 
for a representative customer. The demand curve facing a particular supplier 
248. For a detailed discussion, see Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597-654, (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig eds. 1989). 
249. As we observed previously, whether this transfer is undesirable or is a concern 
of the antitrust laws is controversial. See supra, note 232. 
250. Note that this common assumption is problematic in our case, for it suggests 
that Type III col\usion wi\1 need to be accompanied by some form of limitation on the 
behavior of individual firms akin to Type I col\usion. We ignore this problem to keep our 
example simple. 
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will be more elastic than this market demand curve, reflecting the competing 
options available to the consumer. The firm-level demand of well-informed 
consumers will be much more elastic than this schedule, while the firm-level 
demand of uninformed consumers will approach the demand schedule 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Welfare uuder Imperfect Competition with 
Price Discrimination 
Since the demand schedule in Figure 2 represents market demand, it is 
not possible to illustrate the process by which firms select their prices. Prices 
will be determined according to the demand schedules facing individual 
firms. It is customary in the economics literature to refer to price 
discrimination as occurring between two markets that differ in their 
elasticities of demand. The less elastic market-in our case, the one whose 
customers do not have good alternatives to purchasing from the firm in 
question-is termed the strong market, while the more elastic market is the 
weak market. In Figure 2, Ps denotes the price charged to customers in the 
strong market, and pw the corresponding price for the weak-market customers. 
Given that the suppliers are assumed to be imperfectly competitive, 
possessing some market power, prices in each market will exceed the optimal 
price, c. A price above marginal cost discourages consumers from purchasing 
the optimal number of units, qc. Any quantity demanded below qcmeans that 
some units that could have been sold in this market for more than their 
opportunity cost, c, are not sold. The result is a social welfare loss. For the 
weak market, the loss for one consumer is indicated by the area BEF on the 
diagram. The higher price, ps, charged to less well-informed consumers yields 
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a higher social welfare loss, indicated by areaADF.2s1 
Consider the welfare impact of the San Jose Mercury News article 
instructing consumers how to move from the strong to the weak market. 
Prices in the two markets will not change in response to a movement of a 
small number of customers from one market to the other, but welfare certainly 
will. For each customer switched, social welfare increases by the shaded area 
ABED, the difference between the social welfare losses in the two markets. 
Consumers benefit far more, however, because any consumer paying the 
lower price, Pw, gets the benefit of that price break on the units she would 
have purchased even at the higher price. That transfer is given by area 
psACpw' The total benefit to consumers is given by that area plus their share 
of the gain in surplus due to the purchase of additional units, for a total of 
psABpw. Firms pick up the profits they make on the additional units sold, 
CBED, but lose psACpw to consumers, for a net loss. The loss of the transfer 
provided the source of the dealers' ire against the Mercury News. 
This case is easy to analyze because the movement of a consumer from 
the strong market to the weak market does not affect the price in either 
market. Firms would be charging prices designed to maximize profits from 
strong-market customers prior to defections to the weak market. To raise 
strong-market prices in response to such defections would therefore decrease 
strong-market profits. Hence it is quite likely that agreements such as those 
in Fastline and Santa Clara County Motor Vehicle Dealers. which are 
designed to limit movements between markets, will reduce welfare. It is 
necessary to take into account any additional costs of information or 
negotiation incurred in consequence of consumers shifting markets, but these 
. will be minor in comparison to the significant benefits, particularly for 
consumers, of permitting non-price competition to occur unchecked. 
The analysis of welfare effects is more difficult for agreements that 
affect whether or not price discrimination occurs in the first place, or, if it 
does, how much of a discount is offered. For example, if firms can use 
advertising, coupons, or other devices to induce high-elasticity customers to 
separate themselves from the finn's less price sensitive customers, the 
beneficial impact of lower prices for some customers must be offset by the 
harmful effect on others. Referring again to Figure 2, suppose that 
competition for weak-market customers pushed the price not just to Pw, but 
251. Figure 2 represents a considerable simplification in the interests of managable 
exposition. In practice, welfare losses for strong-market customers wiII be smaller than 
iIlustrated compared to those of weak-market customers. The strong-market customers, 
characterized by relatively inelastic demand, will be less willing to avoid consuming the good 
in question due to high prices. The source of social welfare loss is underconsumption of the 
good, given that its marginal value to consumers (the price they pay) exceeds the cost to 
society of producing additional units. 
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all of the way down to c. Suppose also that the strong-market customers were 
so ill-informed that they could be charged the monopoly price by whichever 
supplier they chose. The discount offered to weak-market customers is then 
Ps - c. What would be the effect of reducing or eliminating this discount? 
Low price consumers would buy less and, to the extent that high prices fell, 
strong-market customers would buy more. Some surplus would be lost from 
the reduced sales to weak-market customers, though, initially at least, not 
much. Since the last units purchased by these customers are valued at little 
more than marginal cost, they do not generate much surplus if purchased, and 
hence not much is lost if purchases are cut. In contrast, an additional unit sold 
to high price customers generates a surplus of approximately distance AD, 
obviously a large gain.2S2 Thus agreements that limit price discrimination or 
that make it impossible may result in lower prices for some customers, and 
overall welfare gains. 
While this possibility may suggest a rule of reason analysis is 
appropriate for such agreements, we believe that the presumption should 
nevertheless be that the agreements are anticompetitive in intent and effect.2S3 
For example, consider a firm's unilateral decision to offer double coupons. 
Note that the offer to double coupon values will provide a discount on 
grocery store margins to customers willing to collect and redeem numbers of 
coupons without necessarily affecting their purchases of the coupon items 
(they might well have redeemed the manufacturer's coupons even without the 
extra inducement, and are typically limited as to the number of units on which 
they receive coupon discounts). Suppose that consumers who do not redeem 
coupons can be charged a monopoly grocery store margin, owing to the 
absence of competition. Suppose also that double coupons yield net margins 
for redeemers near to the competitive level. In the absence of the ability to 
offer double coupons, groceries might well choose instead not to compete for 
weak-market customers, instead offering the monopoly price to their 
committed strong-market customers. The result of limiting or eliminating 
discounts would then be to raise prices to some customers with little or no 




This welfare argument is offered by Winter, supra note 179. 
But see, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Litig., 186 FJd 781,787-88 (7th 
254. This argument is intended only to be suggestive. Models of third-degree price 
discrimination under oligopoly are typically quite complex, with welfare implications 
sensitive to the assumptions incorporated in the model. For an example in which third-degree 
discrimination increases welfare of both the customers who shop and those who do not, see 
Kenneth S. Corts, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and 
Strategic Commitment, 29 RAND J. ECON. 306 (1998). Most models agree that the suppression 
of discounts is least desirable when discounts are offered based upon the willingness of 
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v. CONCLUSIONS 
While it is customary to think of anti competitive agreements as those 
designed to achieve an outcome approximating the monopoly solution for the 
target market, many important agreements that have been the focus of 
prominent antitrust cases do not fit this category of offenses. The aim of such 
agreements is not to replace competition with monopoly cooperation, but 
instead to shape and soften competition among cartel members in order to 
increase the profits of the parties to the agreement. Our new category, 
Type m collusion, together with classic collusion to fix prices and 
agreements to harm outside rivals, constitute a complete classification of 
agreements presenting antitrust problems.255 And since more straightforward 
collusion is clearly illegal, it is un surprising that examples of Type m 
collusion also are widespread. 
This new category of agreement includes instances of collusion that are 
often subtle and complex. Most of the examples of collusion to manipulate 
the rules of competition have arisen in industries with heterogeneous 
products, or in industries where it would be extremely difficult for a classic 
cartel to monitor prices or to detect firms that deviate from agreed-upon 
prices. Under such circumstances one would expect traditional price fixing 
agreements to be uncommon. By contrast, in such markets it is not surprising 
to find cartels that change the rules of competition, of the type described in 
this Article. 
Type m cases thus deserve special recognition, for they are not merely 
attempts to facilitate Type I collusion. Accordingly, their legality should not 
be judged by whether they ultimately contribute to the formation of price 
fixing or of any type of a traditional stable cartel, but rather in terms of their 
immediate impact on prices and resource allocation. Monopolies will not 
plausibly emerge in many of the affected markets, but firms in those markets 
can still profit substantially by weakening, though not destroying, competition 
consumers to switch suppliers, as opposed to exploitation of differences in consumers' 
valuations. It seems likely that the differences among consumers in the valuation of the 
services provided by grocery stores is not nearly so large as differences in their willingness 
to switch outlets in response to monetary inducements, suggesting that double coupons likely 
reduce welfare. 
255. Although this article has analyzed only horizontal agreements, the trichotomy 
it has developed might be able to be employed to classify accurately and to explain every 
other type of antitrust case as well. This would entail categorizing anticompetitive single firm 
behavior and vertical agreements into Type I behavior to attain a monopoly-like outcome 
directly, Type II offenses to disadvantage rivals, and Type III manipulation of the rules of 
competition. 
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among themselves. The persistence of some competition or an absence of a 
shared monopoly in such markets is thus not sufficient to defend challenged 
agreements from antitrust scrutiny. 
It must be remembered that this category of antitrust violation still 
requires market power, which ultimately is still defmed as the power to raise 
price significantly above marginal cost and to exclude, or at least to impede 
substantially, entry by firms attracted by enhanced profits. But the mechanism 
by which this arises is more complex; the changed rules of competition lead 
to independently set supracompetitive pricing, not the collusively determined 
pricing of classic collusion. This underscores that the antitrust enforcers must 
be alert to much more than the traditional manifestations of market power. 
They must guard against the three distinct variations of market power that 
correspond to the three classes of cartels we have identified. 
This Article's classification scheme and new paradigm thus lead to a 
number of benefits. It can help enforcers to concentrate on identifying 
anticompetitive practices in certain industries-to look especially hard for 
collusion to manipulate the rules of competition in industries where classic 
collusion seems unlikely. Likewise, it will help them to understand why 
certain non-traditional practices are likely to harm consumer welfare. Finally, 
joint corporate practices that do not have the characteristics of Types I, II, or 
ill collusion should be regarded as benign or procompetitive. This paradigm 
and trichotomy therefore should act both to help enforcers identify practices 
most likely to harm consumer welfare, and also to reassure them that other 
practices should not be the subject of antitrust concern. 
* * * 
